

APPELLATE CIVIL.

Before Richardson and Shams-ul-Huwa JJ.

BIJOYA KANTA LAHIRI CHOWDHURY

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2.

Jan. 10

KAILASH CHANDRA BHOUMIK.*

tract—Specific performance—Agreement to lease certain share in property at fixed rent and premium—No express provision made for payment of kists and interest on arrears or for security—Draft approved of by pleader to be prepared—Receipt of earnest money—Agreement whether completed or not—Intention of parties.

There may be a completed agreement though a document has to be executed embodying its terms. It depends on the question whether the parties intended that there should be no binding contract till the execution of a document or whether they intended the document to be merely corroborative of the terms of a bargain already completed, even though its execution is in a manner required by law.

Hyam v. Gubbay (1) referred to and distinguished.

Winn v. Bull (2) and *Hampshire v. Wickens* (3) distinguished.

Here the defendant entered into an oral agreement to grant the plaintiff lease of his specified share in certain *mouzas* at a fixed annual rent and stipulated premium, and a draft *pottah* was to be prepared and approved of by his pleader, and part of the premium was paid at once and accepted by the defendant as earnest money, but no such draft was prepared and approved of, and there was no express provision made by the parties as to payments of *kists*, interest on arrears of rent and as to security for payment of the rent:—

Held, that the agreement was complete and enforceable in a suit for specific performance, notwithstanding the omission of the approved draft of express provisions as to *kist*, interest, and security, it having been

* Appeal from Appellate Decree, No. 405 of 1917, against the decree of P. Bagehi, District Judge of Mymensingh, dated Nov. 29, 1916, affirming the decree of Biraja Charan Mitra, Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh, dated April 26, 1911.

(1) (1915) 20 G. W. N. 66.

(2) (1877) 7 Ch. D. 29.

(3) (1878) 7 Ch. D. 555.

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found by the lower Appellate Court that the draft was intended by parties to be merely commemorative of the terms already agreed upon, not a condition of the completion of the agreement; and, further, that matters relating to the *kists* and interest were presumably intended to be regulated by the Tenancy Law of the country, and that no provision for security was necessary.

ON the 30th December 1909 Bijoya Kanta Lahiri, a fractional co-sharer, entered into an oral agreement with Harish Chandra Bhoumik, Bhagoban Chandra Bhoumik and Mohim Chandra Bhoumik to grant them a *putni* lease of his *3as. 15g.* share in *mouzas* Raniga Telipara and Pabai, at an annual rent of Rs. 50 and *salami* or premium of Rs. 1,300. Part of the premium was payable at once and the remainder within a certain time, and a draft *pottah* was to be prepared and approved of by Bijoya's pleader. On the same day a sum of Rs. 400 was paid by the plaintiffs and accepted by Bijoya as earnest money. The balance was tendered but he refused to execute a lease. It appeared that there was no draft prepared and approved of by the pleader.

Harish Chandra and others thereupon filed a suit for specific performance in the Court of Babu B. Charan Mitra, Subordinate Judge of Mymensingh. The defendant admitted an agreement to grant a *putni* lease and also the rent and the premium, but contended that there was no concluded contract which could be specifically enforced. The Court decreed the suit on the 26th November 1911. On appeal by the defendant, the Additional District Judge of Dacca reversed the decision on the ground that there was no concluded agreement because (i) the time of the commencement of the lease was not specified, and (ii) the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had tendered the balance of the premium within the stipulated period. The plaintiffs appealed to the High Court (Appeal from Appellate

ree No. 1183 of 1912). The Court (Mookerjee and e JJ.) reversed the order of the District Judge, on 13th May 1915, and remanded the case.

On the 29th November 1916, Mr. D. P. Bagchi, District Judge of Mymensingh, held that all the essential ingredients of a valid and enforceable contract were established, and overruled the objections based on misrepresentation and mistake as to the actual share of the defendant in the *mouzas*, uncertainty as to who would be *putnidars*: the non-settlement of payments of *kists*, cesses, interest on arrears, of security for due payment of rent: and the absence of a draft approved by the pleader. He upheld the decision of the Subordinate Judge, with some modifications, and directed specific performance. The defendant appealed to the High Court.

Sir Rashbehary Ghose and Babu Mahendra Nath Ghosh, for the appellant.

Babu Jogesh Chandra Roy and Babu Birendra Ram De, for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

RICHARDSON J. This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for specific performance of an agreement for the grant of a lease. The suit has had a long history. Specific performance was granted by the decree of the trial Court, dated 26th April 1911. On appeal that decree was reversed by a decree, dated 13th March 1912, the Court holding that the agreement was incomplete, inasmuch as it did not fix the date on which the lease should commence, and further holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had tendered the balance of the premium within the time stipulated. The plaintiffs preferred a second appeal to the High Court (*No. 1183 of 1912*) which was heard before Mookerjee and Roe JJ. By a judgment,

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dated 13th May 1915, those learned Judges held it was plain, in view of the provisions of section of the Transfer of Property Act, that the intention of the parties must have been, in the absence of indication to the contrary, that the lease should take effect from the date of the execution of the instrument. On the question of tender, the learned Judges held that no time having been fixed for payment of the balance of the premium, the plaintiffs were at liberty to make their tender within a reasonable time. The result was that the decree of the lower Appellate Court was set aside, and the case was remanded to that Court in order that the appeal thereto might be re-heard on the other points which had not been dealt with. The appeal has accordingly been re-heard by the Second Additional District Judge of Mymensingh who has made a decree, dated 1st November 1916, confirming, with some modifications, the decree of the trial Court for specific performance. From that decision the present appeal has been taken by the defendant No. 1.

The appellant is the owner of a fractional share in the property to which the suit relates. The case against the plaintiffs is that he contracted orally to give them a *putni* lease of the share. A close approach to an agreement to that effect is admitted, but it has been contended in defence that, for various reasons other than those already dealt with by the High Court in the judgment of May 1915, the agreement was incomplete and incapable of specific performance.

Some of the questions in controversy in the case below have been finally disposed of in the judgment appealed from, and I shall confine myself to the matters discussed in the arguments before us.

As the suit is based on an oral agreement, no question arises as to the construction of any document.

the terms of the agreement and the intention of the parties are questions of fact depending on oral evidence, and unless the Judge in the Court below has misapplied any principle of law to the facts which he is found, we cannot in second appeal quarrel with his conclusions. Moreover, the Judge is not bound by the language in which he states the terms of the agreement, as gathered by him from witnesses speaking to their recollection of conversations, in the same way in which the parties would be bound by the language of a written document to which they had subscribed their names. The statement of the terms by the Judge can only be regarded as approximating more or less closely to the words which the parties actually used at the time, and the Judge may look at the evidence as a whole for the purpose of elucidating the intention of the parties on any particular point.

Now, the Court below has found that negotiations having been going on for some time, on the 15th Pous, 1315, an agreement was arrived at between the parties comprising in substance four terms or conditions as follows :—

- (i) that defendant No. 1 would grant to the plaintiffs a *putni* lease of his 3 annas and 15 gandas share in *mouzas* Ranigaon, Telipara and Pabai ;
- (ii) that the rent payable by the lessees should be Rs. 50 annually ;
- (iii) that a sum of Rs. 1,300 should be paid as *nazar* or premium : and
- (iv) that a draft lease was to be prepared accordingly, and approved by the defendant's pleader Babu Shyama Charan Roy.

It has further been found that, on the same day, 15th Pous, Rs. 400 was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant by way of earnest money.

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The argument advanced in the Court below that the agreement was incomplete because it made no express provision in regard to certain particulars said to be essential in a *putni* lease, has been pressed before only in reference to three particulars. It is contended that the agreement is deficient in not providing (i) for the *kists* or instalments in which rent should be paid, (ii) for the rate at which interest should run on arrears of rent, and (iii) whether security should or should not be given by the lessees for the due payment of the rent.

As to *kists* and interest on arrears, I agree with the Court below that, in the absence of express agreement, the parties presumably intended that such matters should be regulated by the tenancy law of the country. As to security, there seems no reason why any provision should be made. This contention fails.

The learned vakil for the defendant, however, directed himself mainly to the fourth of the conditions above set out. It has been urged upon him that inasmuch as the preparation of a formal instrument of lease was contemplated, there was no concluded agreement. The effect of a reference to a formal document in connection with an agreement which is being negotiated, was considered in the case of *Hyam v. Gubbay* (1) by the late Chief Justice and two learned Judges of this Court. The result of the English authorities there cited appears to be that it is a question of the intention of the parties whether there is to be no binding contract till the document is executed or whether the document is merely to commemorate—it may be in a manner required by law—the terms of a bargain already complete.

(1) (1915) 20 C. W. N. 66.

The conclusion of the Court below in the present case is that the lease to be drawn up "was only to put in more formal shape the terms agreed upon between the parties with the insertion of usual legal phraseology and terms necessary in a *putni potta*." It is said that the mere fact that a formal document was templated was *prima facie* an indication that the parties did not intend to be bound till it was executed. That may be so, but there was other evidence before the Court. There was, for instance, payment of earnest money. Such payment may be conclusive to show a binding contract, but it is a fact which the Court was entitled to take into consideration. It cannot be said that there is no evidence to support the conclusion at which the Court arrived. That being so, the conclusion must be accepted.

Stress is laid on the draft lease having to be approved by the defendant's pleader, but what reference does that make in the circumstances of the present case? The parties arranged to put their agreement in writing and the writing was to be approved by the defendant's pleader. The two things together, and the whole question is whether there was a concluded agreement. It is settled, as I have said, that there may be a concluded agreement though the document is to be executed embodying its terms. In such a case, the contents of the document have, of course, to be approved by both parties before the document is executed, but merely from the point of view whether the document correctly and formally gives effect to the settled terms of the agreement. If it does, it represents the agreement which either party can be compelled to perform. A reference to the pleader in this connection does not necessarily alter the position. The function of the pleader may

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be merely to say whether the draft correctly carried out the agreement. The defendant, therefore, is not entitled to assert, as he has attempted to do, that merely because mention was made of a draft lease and his pleader's approval thereof, therefore the never was a binding agreement. It was open to the Court to find, and the Court has found, a binding agreement, and all objections on the score of uncertainty and so forth have been rejected. That being so, the defendant cannot resile from the agreement nor can he or his pleader refuse assent to a properly drawn instrument. If it be said that he or his pleader might refuse assent to a draft not in accordance with the agreement, I quite agree. But the defendant has never met the plaintiffs fairly on the ground. He has contended from the first that there was no agreement. No doubt the draft filed by the plaintiffs with the plaint has been found to be open to exception as going beyond the agreement. But the plaintiffs, it appears, have throughout been willing to accept any reasonable modification of the draft. As modified by the directions contained in the decree of the Court below, the draft will apparently meet the requirements of the case.

There is no ground for our interference in Second Appeal and I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

SHAMS-UL-HUDA J. This appeal arises out of a suit for specific performance of a contract. The facts, so far as they have any bearing on the questions raised before us, are shortly these. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant No. 1 agreed with the plaintiffs 2, 4 and 5 to grant to them and to other plaintiffs a *mourus mukarari* lease of the defendant's share in certain *mouzas* at a fixed annual *jama* of Rs. 50, and for a premium of Rs. 1,300, out of which the plaintiffs paid

400 at the time of the agreement and promised to
rest within a month, that the plaintiffs were
willing to pay this amount within the time
the defendant refused to accept the
perform his part of the contract.

inter alia, was that, although there
was for a lease, they had not ripened
that no portion of the premium was
the plaintiffs had made a deposit of
defendant's cashier in anticipation of
all the terms and conditions of the
been settled, and plaintiffs were not,
entitled to a decree for specific performance.

Courts below have found that there was a
agreement between the parties, that there
was, either as regards the land to be
the rent or the premium, and that
regarding the payment of a
premium was true, and have upon these
the plaintiffs' suit.

There was an understanding between
the draft of the *potta* would have to
the defendant's pleader. Plaintiffs
prepared such a draft at defendant's
submitted it to the defendant's pleader
that the draft was so approved after
alterations. This is denied by the defendant
bearing finding on this point.

The learned vakil for the appellant has argued, in the
the agreement is incapable of being
enforced, as all the terms and conditions
not been settled. This argument is
disposed of by the finding of the lower
Court that all the material terms of the
agreement had been settled, that as regards those not ex-
pressly stated was understood that these would be

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in accordance with the provisions of the law in the
behalf in the absence of an express agreement to
contrary. Accordingly the lower Appellate Court, the
directed the defendant No. 1 "to execute a draft lease
in favour of plaintiffs Nos. 2, 4 and 5, for 100
annas and 15 gundas share in mouze No. 100, 101, 102
para and Pabai, in terms agreed upon in the deed
on 15th Pous, 1315, other terms not agreed upon
provided by law". The first contention is that the

It is next argued that, as the parties have not
the execution of a formal lease to them, specific performance cannot be granted of
them, specific performance cannot be granted of this contenti
original agreement. In support of *Bull (1)*, *Hann*
reliance has been placed on *Winn v. Bull (1)* and *Winn*
shire v. Wickens (2), *Hyam v. Gubbae* and other
decisions referred to in the last mentioned case.
seems to me that the cases cited are clearly distinguishable
guishable from the present case.

In *Winn v. Bull (1)*, there was a written agreement whereby the defendant had agreed to take a lease of
house for a certain term at a certain rent "subject to a formal contract
to the preparation and approval of a formal contract, entered into
No such formal contract was, however, entered into and enforced.
and it was held that there was no specific performance of these terms:—
which specific performance could not be granted of an estate in
George Jessel laid down the law in the following words: "we will hold
in the case of a proposed sale or lease if the terms be agreed to by
persons agree to all the terms and said agreement is a contract
the terms put into form", then all the terms put into writing and agreed to, the
put into writing and agreed to, the contract is complete.
If two persons agree in writing that the terms submitted to them
point the terms shall be the terms agreed to, but that the minor terms shall be
but that the minor terms shall be such as are approved of by him
solicitor, and shall be such as are approved of by him and for the benefit of the
plaintiffs parties."

(1) (1877) 7 Ch. D. 29.

(2) (1878) 13 Ch. D. 101.

(3) (1915) 20 C. W. N. 62.

