Limiting my rule, therefore, to these circumstances, and limiting the rule which I have laid down to the exigencies of this case, I would dismiss the appeal, and allowing the cross-objections raised by the plaintiff-respondent, set aside so much of the decrees of the lower Courts as dismiss the suit, and, following the principle of s. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), would frame a decree in terms of s. 88 of that enactment, fixing a period of six months for payment of the money, and in default of such payment awarding sale in enforcement of the plaintiff's lien.

1892

SETH CHITOR MAL v. SHIB LAL

APPELLATE CIVIL,

1891. November 23,

Before Mr. Justice Mahmood.

HAR NARAIN PANDÉ (PLAINTIFF) v. RAM PRASAD MISR AND ANOTHER (DEFENDANTS).*

Pre-emption-Wajib ul-arz-Gift-Shankalp.

No right of pre-emption arises where land is assigned without consideration as **shankalp.

The facts of this case sufficiently appear from the judgment of Mahmood, J.

Munshi Gobind Prasad for the appellant.

Munshi Mudho Prasad for the respondents.

Mahmood, J.—This is a second appeal in regard to a dispute of which the facts are sufficiently clearly stated in the judgment of the lower appellate Court, which Court also framed the issues which arise in the case.

Briefly put, the matter relates to a transaction of the 29th of June 1887, when the defendant-respondent, Harihar Pandé, by an application for mutation of names, applied for and obtained the entry of the name of Ram Prasad Misr in the Government revenue records in respect of the property now in suit.

^{*} Second Appeal No. 1408 of 1889, from a decree of Maulvi Muhammad Mazhar Husain, Additional Subordinate Judge of Goraklipur, dated the 12th September 1889, confirming a decree of Pandit Alopi Prasad, Munsif of Basti, dated the 24th April 1888.

1891

HAR NARAIN PANDÉ v. RAM PRA-SAD MISR. Thereupon the present plaintiff-appellant, Har Narain Pandé, dissatisfied with the transaction above mentioned, came into Court suing to enforce his right of pre-emption in respect to the transaction of the 29th of June 1887. Now this transaction is described as shankalp, and it has been found that it was a pure gift without any pecuniary consideration for it, and that it was not a sale, and upon this ground both the Courts below have concurred in dismissing the suit.

From these two concurrent decrees this second appeal has been preferred, and Mr. Gobind Prasad in his argument has relied upon the ruling of the majority of this Court in the Full Bench case of Janki v. Girjadat (1), where the majority of the Court laid down a proposition of law from which I had the misfortune to dissent. The learned vakil has also relied upon two unreported rulings of this Court in F. A. No. 170 of 1886 and F. A. No. 171 of 1886, which were decided by the present learned Chief Justice and my brother Tyrrell on the 22nd of February 1889.

Now in disposing of the case I do not wish to consider these various rulings in detail, because in my opinion the whole point upon which Mr. Gobind Prasad's argument rests is that according to the terms of the wājib-ul-arz in the case not only does preemption arise in respect of sale and mortgage, but also in respect of a simple gift without valuable consideration. The learned vakil in so arguing has invited my attention to the terms of the wājib-ul-arz in the two unreported cases above mentioned, and I think I may say that there is perhaps some cogency in the analogical comparison which he drew from the terms of the wājib-ul-arz in those cases as supplying a rule of interpretation for this wājib-ul-arz also. But, be it as it may, I think the exigencies of this case require me only to interpret this wājib-ul-arz, which is the document before me, and of which s. 6 relating to pre-emption runs as follows:—

چهتریی یه که هملوگوں میں اپنا حصه کل یا جزر بذریعه بیع و رهن وغیره کے جدا کیا چاهے تو پہلے حصددار کے هاتهه بیچے و اگر وہ نه لیوے تب راید لا کے دیا کیا چاہے تو پہلے حصد (1) اللہ 1) کا دیا کہ دیا کہ کا دیا کہ کے دیا کہ کا دیا کا دیا کہ ک

اختیار انتقال بدست غیر هوگا اگر بلا اطلاع حصددار غیر کے هاتهم منتقل کرے تو وہ حق شفع کی روسے ناجائز هوگا فقط *

1891

HAR NARAIN PANDÉ v. RAM PRA-

SAB MISR.

Now the words upon which Mr. Gobind Prasad relies most are The first is the use of the word 'sit;' or "et cetera" after the words "بيح , رهن," " sale and mortgage," and the second word upon which the learned vakil relies is the word " وتتقال " or " transfer," which occurs later on in the pre-emptive clause. opinion that, although the clause is not so clearly worded as it might have been, the rule of interpretation is well recognized, that where words describing one class of objects are employed and followed by the words "et cetera," or words of a like signification, it must be understood that they are limited to that class of objects. Here it is clear to my mind what "رهن " and " رهن " mean, one meaning "sale" and the other "mortgage," and the term "et cetera," "s,ei,," which is employed thereafter, does not render the right of pre-emption available in respect of any such transaction as a simple gift, that is to say, gift without consideration, or a shankalp as in this case. I am fortified in this interpretation by the use of the word " that is to say "sell," which occurs later on in the clause, and in view of these words the generic term "التقال" or "transfer" does not in my opinion extend the right of pre-emption to any transfer which may be without pecuniary consideration.

Moreover, I have frequently said that in such cases of pre-emption, though based upon the wājib-ul-arz, in case of doubt or difficulty the principles of the Muhammadan law of pre-emption, which originated the right in India, should be applied, and here the finding being clear that the shankalp complained of was without pecuniary consideration and was a simple gift, it follows that no right of pre-emption would exist.

I therefore hold that the Courts below acted rightly in dismissing the suit, and I dismiss the appeal with costs, as the respondent is represented by Mr. Becha Ram holding the brief of Mr. Madho Prasad.

Appeal dismissed.