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The receiver, as stated above, has declined to furnish security. The appeal must accordingly be dismissed with costs, which may be recovered as a debt against the estate of the original appellants.

Before Mr. Justice Thom and Mr. Justice Rachhpal Singh

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February, 28

MUHAMMAD QAMAR SHAH KHAN (PLAINTIFF) *v.*
MUHAMMAD SALAMAT ALI KHAN (DEFENDANT)*

Agra Tenancy Act (Local Act III of 1926), section 226—Suit for profits—“Co-sharer”—Mutwalli—Whether mutwalli can maintain suit for profits—Wakf—Status of mutwalli in a private wakf.

A certain village was wakf property, the plaintiff and the defendant being the two mutwallis, and the plaintiff's share as recorded in the khewat being one-third. In a suit for profits under the Agra Tenancy Act brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, who was the lambardar, it was objected that a mutwalli was not a “co-sharer” and could not bring such a suit.

Held that a mutwalli was a “co-sharer” within the meaning of the Agra Tenancy Act, though he might not be a person having full proprietary interest in the share held by him. For the purposes of the Act a co-sharer is a person whose name is recorded in the khewat as a co-sharer and who is jointly and severally liable with other co-sharers for the land revenue and whose revenue is payable through the lambardar under section 144 of the Land Revenue Act. Any person whose name is recorded in the khewat as holding a share in the village is entitled to maintain a suit for profits, regardless of the fact whether or not he holds it as proprietor or as manager or mutwalli.

Per curiam—In the case of a private wakf a mutwalli holding the wakf property cannot be said to be a mere manager or superintendent, but is, practically speaking, the owner, with one limitation—that he cannot make a transfer; in every other respect his position is the same as that of an owner.

*Second Appeal No. 711 of 1930, from a decree of J. R. W. Bennett, District Judge of Pilibhit, dated the 22nd of February, 1930, confirming a decree of Abdul Majid Khan, Assistant Collector, first class, of Pilibhit dated the 29th of December, 1925.

Dr. *S. N. Sen* and Mr. *Mukhtar Ahmad*, for the appellant.

Sir *Tej Bahadur Sapru* and Mr. *P. N. Sapru*, for the respondent.

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THOM and RACHHPAL SINGH, JJ. :—The plaintiff appellant instituted a suit in the trial court against the defendant respondent to recover a sum of Rs.1,058-9-7 on account of profits. The plaintiff alleged that village Maktul was wakf property, of which he and the defendant were mutwallis. The plaintiff's share in the wakf property was one-third. In the years in suit the defendant had acted as a lambardar and the plaintiff sued for his share in those years.

The defendant in his written statement admitted that the entire village was wakf property and that he and the plaintiff were holding it as mutwallis. He, however, raised the plea that the mutwallis were not co-sharers within the meaning of section 164 of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901 (the suit had been instituted before the passing of the new Agra Tenancy Act) and so he (the plaintiff) could not maintain a suit for profits. This contention was accepted by the courts below. Both the courts have held that a mutwalli is not a co-sharer and cannot, therefore, maintain a suit for profits. The plaintiff has preferred this second appeal.

Section 226 of the New Agra Tenancy Act corresponds to section 164 of the old Act (Act II of 1901). Under the provisions of this section a co-sharer may sue the lambardar for settlement of accounts and for his share in profits. Section 229 (corresponding with section 166 of the old Agra Tenancy Act) lays down that the words lambardar co-sharer, muafidar, assignee of revenue, taluqdar, and superior proprietor in Chapter XIV include also the heirs, legal representatives, executors, administrators and assigns of such persons

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The question for determination is as to whether the view taken by the courts below, namely, that a mutwalli cannot maintain a suit for profits is sound in law. In a recent case a Bench of two Judges of this Court held that for the purposes of suits for profits managers of endowed properties were to be regarded as proprietors and, therefore, could sue in rent courts as co-sharers. That was a case in which the parties were Hindus, but we are of opinion that the principle laid down in that case is applicable to the case before us.

The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that any person whose name is recorded in the khewat as holding a share in the village is entitled to maintain a suit for profits, regardless of the fact whether or not he holds it as proprietor or as a mutwalli. We are in agreement with this contention.

In the Full Bench ruling of *Durga Prasad v. Hazari Singh* (1) six out of the seven learned Judges held that in suits instituted under the provisions of chapter XI of the Agra Tenancy Act of 1901, where the plaintiff was recorded as having proprietary title entitling him to institute the suit, the revenue court could not go behind the record, receive evidence and itself try the question of proprietary title. This ruling is authority for the principle on which the appellant relies that in a case where a person is recorded in the khewat as holding a particular share in a village the entry gives him the right to institute suits as a co-sharer and it is not open to the revenue court to go into the question as to whether or not he has, standing the entry in his favour, a "proprietary right" in the share standing in his name.

Learned counsel who appeared for the respondent has contended that the word "co-sharer" means a person who has a proprietary interest in the share held by him. His argument is that when a wakf is created, the property vests in God and the mutwalli's

(1) (1911) I. L. R., 33 All., 799.

position is that of a mere manager or superintendent. No estate vests in him and, therefore, he cannot be said to be a co-sharer. On behalf of the respondent the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in *Muhammad Rustam Ali Khan v. Mushtaq Husain* (1) was cited. In that case, we see that their Lordships of the Privy Council made the following observations: "A receiver and manager by virtue of his appointment has no estate in the property he is called upon to control; he possesses powers over it but not an interest in it." The sole question for the determination in that case was whether an estate in the property passed to the trustees appointed under the wakfnama. The view taken by their Lordships was that no estate passed. Another ruling cited by the learned counsel for the appellant was *Narain Das Arora v. Haji Abdur Rahim* (2), where a Bench of two Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that a mutwalli of a wakf estate was a mere manager, and in the case of a public charitable endowment the legal ownership of the property dedicated was in the Divine Being or in the charity created in His name. These rulings, in our opinion, are authorities for the proposition only that a mutwalli holding the wakf property has no estate in it. That is to say, the property in it is not transferred to him. If the word "co-sharer" means only a person who has full proprietary interest in the share held by him, then certainly the main contention of the respondent would be sound. On a consideration of the question, however, we are of opinion that the word "co-sharer" for the purposes of the Rent Act should not be given such a narrow interpretation. It will be seen that the term "co-sharer" has nowhere been defined in the Agra Tenancy Act. In our opinion, the correct definition of a co-sharer would be a person whose name is recorded in the khewat as a co-sharer and who is jointly and severally liable with other co-sharers for

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(1) (1920) I. L. R., 42 All., 609.

(2) (1920) I. L. R., 47 Cal., 886.

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the land revenue and whose revenue is payable through the lambardar under section 144 of the Land Revenue Act. If a person is liable for the payment of the land revenue along with other co-sharers in the village, then he must be deemed to be a co-sharer in spite of the fact that the estate in the share may not vest in him. It has been held that a mortgagee in possession whose name is recorded as such in the khewat can sue for profits: See *Lachman Pande v. Tribeni Sahu* (1). According to the view taken in this case it appears that all that is necessary is to see whether or not the name of the man is recorded as co-sharer. If it is recorded, then section 201(3) of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1901, would apply. It may also be mentioned that a special manager of the court of wards is permitted to institute suits for rent and profits, though the estate does not vest in him. If the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent were accepted many curious results would follow. Take the case of two mutwallis who hold the entire village which is wakf property. If they institute rent suits against their tenants, then it would be open to the tenants to say, if the argument of the respondent is accepted, that they cannot recover rents as they are not co-sharers in the village. Take another case: One mutwalli realizes the entire rent. When he is sued by the other it would be open to him to defeat the claim in the rent court by saying that the other is not a co-sharer as he does not own any proprietary right in the share recorded in his name. One more case: Suppose that there are several co-sharers in a village. One of them holding a share which is wakf happens to be a lambardar. Under the scheme of the Land Revenue Act the Government realizes the entire land revenue from him. The rents have been realized by other co-sharers. When he sues the co-sharers for the land revenue, then, according to the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, it

(1) (1924) 22 A. L. J., 518.

would be open to the other co-sharers to say that no suit would lie in the revenue court as the lambardar was holding the share standing in his name only as a mutwalli of a wakf and had no proprietary interest in the same.

The mutwallis would not be able to eject their tenants as they would be met with the plea that they (the mutwallis) were not co-sharers. In other words, the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act and Agra Tenancy Act would not be applicable to those persons holding shares in wakf villages. We are not prepared to hold that this is a sound view of rent law.

In Muhammadan law there are two classes of wakf. One is public and the other is private. A public wakf is one for a public religious or charitable object. A private wakf is one for the benefit of the settlor's family and his descendants. Under the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913 a Muhammadan may settle the whole income of the endowed property for the maintenance and support of himself and his descendants from generation to generation, provided that there is an ultimate gift to charity. To hold that a mutwalli holding wakf property in a wakf of this kind is not a co-sharer for the purposes of the Rent Act would be taking a very narrow view. It is true that according to the view taken in *Muhammad Rustam Ali Khan's* case (1) and *Narain Das Arora's* case (2), the estate in the wakf property vests in God after the creation of a public wakf. But we doubt if it can be argued that in private wakfs the estate vests in God. The correct view would be to hold that the estate vests in the beneficiaries. In the case of private wakfs the mutwalli is, practically speaking, the owner, with one limitation and that is that he cannot make a transfer of the wakf property. But in every other respect his position is the same as that of an owner. A mutwalli holding a property in the case of a private wakf cannot

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(1) (1920) I. L. R., 42 All., 609.

(2) (1920) I. L. R., 47 Cal., 866.

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be said to be a mere manager or a superintendent. A manager holds the property during the pleasure of the proprietor. But the mutwalli in private wakfs holds the property during his life. After his death the mutwalliship will go to his legal heirs. If there are several heirs they will all be entitled to the profits of the wakf estate. The mutwalli in the case of a private wakf would not be accountable to any outsider in respect of the income of the wakf property. We are unable to accept the contention of the respondent that a mutwalli cannot be said to be a co-sharer. Nor are we prepared to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that no one who is not a proprietor can be said to be a co-sharer within the meaning of section 226 of the Agra Tenancy Act. In our opinion, any man whose name is recorded in the khewat as a co-sharer will be deemed to be such within the meaning of section 226 of the Agra Tenancy Act. For the purposes of the Agra Tenancy Act, it is not necessary for the revenue court to decide as to whether the person recorded as a co-sharer in the khewat is a proprietor or mortgagee in possession or a mutwalli. We agree with the view taken by a Bench of learned Judges of this Court in *Sahu Manhuri Saran v. Sahu Shambhu Nath* (1) that for the purposes of suits for profits managers of endowed properties should be regarded as proprietors.

We hold that the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his suit for profits against the defendant.

For the reasons given above we allow the appeal, reverse the decrees of the courts below and remand the case to the court of first instance through the lower appellate court.

(1) S. A. No. 133 of 1930, decided on the 10th of February, 1933.