1930 We are in complete acoord with the view cxpressed Sum An at pages 691 and 692 of the roport and with the reasons $\frac{v}{a}$ Jationan set out there.
Rams.
Both upon principle and anthowities, wo have no doubt that the ordar in controversy was in substance a decree as defmed in the Code of Civil Proceduro and was appealable as such.

As the applicant did not prase tho tight remorty, he cannot be pormitted to come up th this Comet in revision and challonge the order mater swotion 175 of the Codo of Civil Procedme. Wo dimmiss this application whth costs.

## APPELIATE CIVIL.

Before Mr. Justice Banerii and Mr'. Justice King.

MOFAN TAT (APPLICANT) v. MATHAVA PBABAD aND orners (Opposifg parmersi*
Provinciai Insolvency Act (V of 1920), section 35-Anmalmerit of adjudication-Grounds on which an annoment order can be passed.
The only grounds upon which an adfudication of insofvency can be annulled are those mentioned in section 35 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, and the comrt has no juristiction to annul the adjudication of an insolvent on the grown that he was dishonest in his dealings, that he was entering reckessly into transactions and incurring debts which he never lompod to repay, that he had destroyed his accomb books, and that he showed certain debts as due to him although ho hod alrondy realised them, as none of these facts would have furnisher a ground for dismissing the insoiveney petition.

Mr. K. Verma, for the appellant.
Mr. Gadadhar Prasad, for the respondents.
Banerdi and King, JJ.:-This is an appeal against an order passed by the learned District Judge of Benares on the 25th of October, 1929, annullines an order of adjudication passed in respect of one Molan Lal under the Provincial Tasolvency Act, 1920.

[^0]Mohan Lal presented an insolvency petition on
1030 the 26th of November, 1994. He showed the debts monar Lat duo from him as about Rs. 32,000, and showed assets, mainly in the shape of debts due to him, amomting to about Res. 24,000 . On 21st Noverber, 1925, the Mistrict Judge adjudged the applicant an insolvent and ordered him to apply for his diwharge within one year. The applicant did apply within the prescribec period. The period was extended from time to time mpon the motion of the official receiver and successive applications for discharge were made. The last applicotion was made on the 17 th of September, 1928. On the 8 th of April, 1929 , the official receiver submitted a report recommending that 'as the actions of the insolvent have not been very fare and straightforward', the insolvency should be annulled, or the insolvent should be discharged and permission should be granted to the official receiver to sell the assets of the insolvent.

The learned District Fadge found that the insolvent had bem dishonest in his deakigs. The insolvent stated that ho hat sold Rs. 9,000 worth of goods to a certain State without obtaining any receipt and without making eny note of it in his accomnt books, or keeping any memorandum on the transaction, ade these omissions showed, in the Judge's opinion, that the insolvent was dishonest. Moreover the Judge found that an item of Rs. 10,000 , which was shown in the schedule as being due from a certain Raia, had been paid by the Raja into the trensury but had been refunded in the year 1923. The District Judge remarks that it is not clear to whom the money was paid, but apperently ho held that it must have been paid to the insolvent himself. The District Judge states that either the insolvent has no assets, which shows that be was entering recklessly into transactions with various persons and incurring debts

Madrav: Prasad.
which he never hoped to pay, or that he had realized

Toman Lai all the amounts and has destroyed his account books路组Ava so that no evidence may be available. Upon these Teasad. grounds the Judge annulled the adjudication.

It has been urged that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to annul the adjudication upon the grounds stated by him. In our opinion the contention is well founded. The only section, applicable to the case, under which the District Judge could have anmulled the adjudication is section 35. Under that section the Judge could have amnulled the adjudication if, in the opinion of the court, the debtor ought not to have been adjudged insolvent. There are no other grounds upon which the court could, in the eiremustances of this case, have legilly anmulled the auljudicantion.

Even if the facts foomd by the Districh Judge are correct, they do not in our opinion furnish any legal ground for annulling the adjudication, becanse they do not show that the debtor nught not to have been adjudged insolvent. It may be accepter that the insolvent was dishonest in lis dealings, and that he had no assets and that he destroyed his accurnt books and that he was entering recklessly into transactious and incurring debts which he never hoped to repay. It may further be conceded that he realised certain delts due to him hefore presenting the insolveney petition and nevertheless showed those dehts as still due to him. None of these facts would have furuished the court which passed the order of adjudication any grounds for dismissing the insolvency petition. The debtor was entitled under section 10 to prosent the petition as he was unable to pay his debts, and his debts amounted to Rs. 500. These facts have never been doubted. The court therefore could mont have dismissed the petition under section $25(2)$. The facts found may furnish grounds for refusing an absolute
order of discharge, but they furnish no grounds for dismissing an insolvency petition and consequently Moran Las no grounds for annulling an adjudication. The ruling of the Judicial Committee in Chhatrapat Singh Dugrr Madiava PrasAd. v. Kharag Singh Lachmiram (1) may be referred to in support of our view.

We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the court below anmulling the adjudication. The District Judge should now proceed to pass orders on the application for discharge. The appellant will get his costs of this appeal.

Bejore Mr. Justice Banerji and Mr. Justice King.
LaCHHMT NARAJN (Platntiff) $v$. BENI RANT
(Defendant)*
Partnership-Death of one of two partners-llinor son left -17.
as heir-Business continued by surviving partner--
Liability to heir of deceased partner for share of profits
made-Trusts Act (II of 1882), section 88, illustration
(f)-Contract Act (IX of 1872), sections 241, 247.
Tjpon the death of one of two partners in a business, Beaving a minor son as his heir, the business was not womd up but was carried on by the surviving partner, all the assets being retained and employed in the business. Hold, that in view of the provisions of section 88, illustration ( $f$ ), of the Trusts Act, the survivor carrying on the business was liable to account to the heir of the deceased parther for his share of the profits made by the survivor.

Section 24.7 of the Contract Act conld not apply to the cuse, as upon the death of one of two partners, there remained no partnership in existence, to the benefits of which the minor could be deemed to have been admitted.

Section 241 of the Contract Act had no application to the facts of the case, in which the minor had sued for accounts and share of profits.

Messts. S. N. Seth and Damodar Prasad Sarena, for the appellant.

Dr. K. N. Katju and Messrs. U. S. Bajpai, M. N. Kaul and G. S. Pathak, for the respondent.

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[^0]:    *First Appeal No. 28 of 1930, from an order of Harish Cliandra, District Judge of Beanres, dated the 25 thl $_{1}$ of Octoher, 1929.

[^1]:    *Birst Appeal No. 30 of 1929 , from a decree of Raja Ram, Suboratinate Judge of Cawnpore, dated the 18th of September, 1928. (1) (1916) I.L.R., 44 Cal., 535.

