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my satisfaction that there is any well-grounded reason to fear that, if Sonábái be not married during the present marriage season, she may be condemned to a life of perpetual celibacy.

The affidavits of Anand Gangádhar Joshi, Pándurang Bháskar Joshi, and Vishnu Mahádev Thosar on the subject are extremely guarded, and are sufficiently met by the affidavit of the plaintiff and of others not replied to. I make the rule absolute until the hearing. The costs will be costs in the cause.

Rule absolute.

Attorneys for the plaintiff:—Messrs. *Bálkrishna and Dikshit.*

Attorneys for the defendants:—Messrs. *Winter and Burder.*

ORIGINAL CIVIL.

Before Mr. Justice Farran.

1886. *July* 22.

NA'NA'BHA'I GANPATRA'V DHAIRYAVA'N AND ANOTHER, (PLAINTIFFS), *v.* ACHRATBA'I AND OTHERS, (DEFENDANTS).*

Hindu law—Ancestral property—Burden of proof where property alleged to be ancestral—Property derived by a son from his mother where it originally formed part of his father's estate.

Where a Hindu by will leaves property to another which is afterwards alleged to be ancestral by members of the testator's family, the burden of proving it to be ancestral rests on the plaintiffs. There is no presumption of Hindu law as to its character.

Pándurang Mánkoji, a Hindu, died in 1831, having by his will bequeathed all his estate to his wife Párvati and his three minor sons, Vithobá, Govind, and Ganpatráv, and directed as follows:—"In the event of my wife's demise previous to my sons attaining their full age of twenty-one years, to entitle them to claim their respective shares of whatever may be left after marrying, &c., then I direct my surviving executors will secure my property and divide the whole among such sons, or the survivors of them." Subsequently to the testator's death, his widow Párvati managed his estate, and probate of his will was granted to her alone in January, 1832. In 1836 she bought the V. property for Rs. 2,801. There was no evidence to show out of what funds this property was bought, but the deed of sale stated that it was assigned to "Párvati, widow and administratrix of the late Pándurang Mánkoji, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns." In 1845 the eldest son Vithobá separated from the family, and gave a release to his mother Párvati. In 1854 she purchased the P. property for Rs. 8,452, the conveyance being to

* Suit No. 138 of 1884.

"Párvati, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns." In this deed, also, she was described as "the widow and administratrix of Pándurang Mánkoji, deceased." In the same year, *viz.*, 1854, the second son Govind separated, and gave Párvati a release. The third son Ganpatráv, (the third defendant), continued to live with his mother Párvati until 1871, in which year she died intestate. Ganpatráv then entered into possession of all the property which she had or managed in her lifetime, including the V. and P. properties. In 1879 he mortgaged these properties to the first two defendants for Rs. 12,500. His sons, (the plaintiffs), now alleged those properties to be ancestral, and complained that he and the mortgagees were acting in collusion; that he had charged the properties unnecessarily; and that he and the mortgagees were about to sell them at an undervalue for the purpose of defeating their (the plaintiffs') rights. They, therefore, filed this suit, and prayed *(inter alia)* that the claims of the mortgagees, after being ascertained, might be paid off. The defendants denied that the properties in question were ancestral property in the hands of Ganpatráv, (the third defendant), or that the plaintiffs, as his sons, had any interest therein.

Held, that the interest which the third defendant Ganpatráv derived from his mother Párvati in the mortgaged premises was ancestral property in respect of which the plaintiffs had no present right of interference.

The Court ordered that on payment of the mortgage-debt the properties should be reconveyed to the third defendant, and, in the event of their being sold, that the whole of the surplus proceeds should be paid to him.

The original property was to be regarded, as in 1831, the self-acquired property of Pándurang Mánkoji, and as having passed under his will. In the absence of any evidence with regard to it, there was no presumption as to its character; and the plaintiffs, who alleged it to be ancestral, were bound to prove that fact.

On Pándurang Mánkoji's death, his sons, Vithobá, Govind, and Ganpat, (third defendant), took whatever they became entitled to, under their father's will, as their self-acquired property, but in co-parcenery according to Hindu law, and not as joint tenants according to English law. As to Párvati, she took, under the will, an equal interest with her sons in the testator's estate, liable to be defeated in the event of her death before the sons attained the age of twenty-one years, when they might claim their shares. On the sons claiming their shares, one share would be left with Párvati, and that share, subject to her incapacity as a Hindu widow to deal with immoveable property given her by her husband, would then become hers absolutely.

Vithobá and Govind having separated, Párvati and Ganpatráv, (third defendant), continued to treat themselves as a joint family, and when Párvati died in 1871, her share in the joint property lapsed for the benefit of Ganpatráv. That share, whether he took it by inheritance or by survivorship, having originally formed part of his father's estate, became ancestral in his hands.

THE plaintiffs were the sons of the third defendant, Ganpatráv Pándurang, who had mortgaged certain properties to the first and second defendants. The plaintiffs in this suit sought to restrain

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the first and second defendants, (the mortgagees), from selling or completing the sale of these properties; and prayed that the said defendants might be ordered to render a true account of the mortgage executed to them by the third defendant.

The two properties in question were situated, the one at Vithalvádi and the other at Parel, in Bombay; and they were mortgaged by the third defendant to the first and second defendants on the 2nd June, 1879, for the sum of Rs. 12,500, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 *per cent. per annum*. The plaintiffs alleged that the two properties were ancestral, and were worth Rs. 45,000; and that their father Ganpatráv, (the third defendant), was, at the time of the mortgage, in need only of a sum of about Rs. 6,000, in order to satisfy a decree which had been passed against him; and they submitted that their father had no right, under the Hindu law, to charge the properties with a larger sum than was necessary. They further complained that since the date of the said mortgage their father, (the third defendant), had improperly and unnecessarily obtained further loans from the first two defendants, with whom he was acting in collusion, and had charged these further loans on the said two properties, so that the amount now due to the first two defendants amounted nearly to Rs. 22,000; and that this was done for the purpose of defeating the plaintiffs' future rights in their ancestral property.

The plaintiffs further alleged that the first two defendants had been advertising the sale of the two properties, and, in collusion with the third defendant, had attempted to effect a collusive sale at an undervalue; that the Vithalvádi property, which was worth Rs. 30,000, had actually been sold for Rs. 17,500, and had been bought in by the first and second defendants in the name of another person.

The plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the defendants might be restrained from selling or completing the sale of either property until the hearing of this suit; that the sale of the Vithalvádi property might be declared null and void, and that the said property might be sold by the Court, and the claim of the first and second defendants, after being ascertained, might be paid off.

The fourth and fifth defendants were first cousins of the plaintiffs, being sons of Govind Pándurang, a deceased brother of Ganpatráv Pándurang, the third defendant. Govind had in his lifetime claimed to be interested in the mortgaged properties, and the plaintiffs, therefore, made his sons parties to this suit, and as against them prayed for a declaration that they had no interest in the properties in question.

As above stated, the plaintiffs alleged that the mortgaged properties were ancestral properties. The following is a genealogical table of the plaintiffs' family :—



Pándurang Mánkoji, the grandfather of the plaintiffs and the father of the third defendant, died in 1831, possessed of considerable moveable and immoveable property; but whether this property was ancestral or self-acquired in his hands, there was no evidence to show. He was divided from his brothers, of whom he had three. At his death he left three sons, *viz.*, Vithobá, Govind, and the third defendant Ganpatráv; and by his will, dated the 18th August, 1831, he appointed two of his brothers and his wife Párvati his executors, and bequeathed his property as follows :—

"I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife and three minor sons, Vithobá, Govind, and Ganpatráv, all my estate and property whatever, besides the pension which might be allowed them from Warden's Official Fund, to which I have been a subscriber for twenty-eight years. In the event of my wife's demise previous to my sons attaining their full age of twenty-one years, to entitle them to claim their respective shares of whatever may be left after marrying, &c., then I direct my surviving executors will secure my property, and divide the whole among such sons or the survivors of them."

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Subsequently to her husband's death, Párvati managed the estate. Probate of his will was granted to her alone on the 4th June, 1832. On the 9th January, 1836, she bought the Vithalvádi property for Rs. 2,801. The deed of sale stated that this property was conveyed to "Párvati, widow and administratrix of the late Pándurang Mánkoji, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns;" but there was no evidence to show out of what funds this property was bought.

In 1845 the eldest son Vithobá separated from the family, and gave a release to Párvati, his mother.

In 1854 Párvati purchased the Parel property for Rs. 8,452, the conveyance being to "Párvati, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns." In this deed, also, she was described as "the widow and administratrix of Pándurang Mánkoji, deceased."

In the same year, 1854, the second son Govind separated and gave Párvati a release. In 1871 Párvati died intestate; and Ganpatráv, (the third defendant), who had until then continued to reside with her, entered into possession of all the property which she had or managed in her lifetime, including the two properties in question in this suit.

Prior to her death, *viz.*, in 1862, Párvati had mortgaged, by way of equitable mortgage, both these properties to one Pestonji Dinshá, whose assignee, Adarji Dádábhái, brought a suit upon the mortgage, and in August, 1877, obtained a decree[1]. In order to pay off this decree, Ganpatráv mortgaged the two properties in question to the first two defendants for Rs. 12,500 on the 2nd June, 1879, as stated in the plaint.

Macpherson and *B. Tyabji* for the plaintiffs.

Starling and *Telang* for defendants Nos. 1 and 2.

Lang and *Vicáji* for defendant No. 3.

Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 appeared in person.

For the plaintiffs it was contended that the mortgaged property was ancestral—Mayne on Hindu Law, p. 248, 249; *Muttayan Chettiar* v. *Sangili Vira Pandia Chinnatambiar*[2]; *Nund Coomar Lall* v. *Razeeooddeen*[3]; West and Bühler, p. 714.

(1) See I. L. R., 3 Bom., p. 312. (2) L. R., 9 Ind. App., 128, at pp. 142-143.
(3) 10 Beng. L. R., 183, at p. 192.

For the defendants it was contended that Pándurang Mánkoji having made a will, the presumption was that his property was self-acquired; and that, after his death, Párvati and Ganpatráv held it jointly. Counsel referred to Mayne's Hindu Law, sec. 250; West and Bühler, p. 331, note (E).

5th August, 1886. FARRAN, J.:—By an indenture of mortgage bearing date the 2nd June, 1879, the third defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang mortgaged two properties—one at Vithalvádi and the other at Parel—to the first and second defendants, to secure repayment of the sum of Rs. 12,500, with interest thereon at the rate of 12 *per cent. per annum*. The first and second defendants, Achratbái and Nárrandás Nathubhái, made some abortive attempt to sell the mortgaged properties, and ultimately bought them in the name of Purshotam Narottam, the sixth defendant.

The plaintiffs, Nánábhái Ganpatráv and Bálji Ganpatráv, the sons of the third defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang, have filed the present suit, praying, in effect, that it may be declared that the mortgaged premises are ancestral in the hands of their father Ganpatráv Pándurang, and that the plaintiffs are equally interested with him therein; and further, (alleging that Ganpatráv Pándurang is colluding with the mortgagees, and that the properties are in danger of being sold at an undervalue), that the mortgaged premises may be sold under the direction of the Court, and that the first and second defendants, the mortgagees, may be paid what is justly due to them, and that the balance may be dealt with, having regard to the rights of the plaintiffs and of the third defendant *inter se*.

The defendants Nos. 4 and 5, Gajánand Govind and Moreshvar Govind, are minors. They are added as defendants to the suit, because their father Govind Pándurang in his lifetime claimed to be interested in the mortgaged premises; and the plaintiffs seek a declaration that his minor sons are not interested therein. As to the latter portion of the relief sought by the plaint, I consider that it cannot be given in this suit, and the defendants Gajánand and Moreshvar will be dismissed therefrom without prejudice to their rights (if any) against the property in the possession of the third defendant and of the plaintiffs.

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Save as to the misjoinder of the minor defendants, no objection is taken to the frame of the suit; and it has been agreed between the parties that, whatever may be the rights of the plaintiffs and of the third defendant *inter se*, the mortgaged properties, in the event of their not being redeemed, shall be sold by the Court, and the amount justly due to the mortgagees paid thereout; the balance being dealt with according to the rights of the plaintiffs and of the third defendant respectively therein.

The only issues, accordingly, which need be dealt with in the suit are the second, fourth, and fifth, which are—

(2) Whether the property comprised in the said mortgage is or was ancestral property in the hands of the third defendant.

(4) What sum is due at foot of the said mortgage.

(5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to any and what relief in this suit. No evidence has as yet been given on the fourth issue. It has been reserved until after the decision on the second.

The only facts proved relating to the second issue are these. Pándurang Mánkoji, the father of the defendant Ganpatráv, was divided from his brothers, Cambá, Venkoba, and Bháskar Mánkoji. Of these, Bháskar when he died left no property. Cambá, who was an orderly in the Chief Engineer's office on pay of Rs. 20 or Rs. 25 *per* month, left one small house. Venkobá died possessed of property of some value.

Pándurang Mánkoji died in or about the Christian year 1831, possessed of two carts and a piece of vacant land in Bombay, besides moveable property of considerable value. He left a will, bearing date the 18th of August, 1831, whereby he appointed his brothers Venkobá and Cámbá and his wife Párvati his executors and executrix respectively; and devised and bequeathed his property in the following words:—

"I give and bequeath unto my beloved wife and three minor sons, Vithobá, Govind, and Ganpatráv, all my estate and property whatever, besides the pension, which might be allowed them from Warden's Official Fund, to which I have been a subscriber for twenty-eight years. In the event of my wife's demise previous to my sons attaining their full age of twenty-one years, to

entitle them to claim their respective shares of whatever may be left after marrying, &c., then I direct my surviving executors will secure my property, and divide the whole among such sons or the survivors of them." He also made provision for his daughters. Párvati and her three sons survived the testator, and probate of his will was granted to Párvati alone on the 4th June 1882 (exhibit A).

Beyond what may be inferred from the above statement of facts, there is nothing to show whether the property, of which Pándurang Mánkoji died possessed, was ancestral or self-acquired in his hands. Párvati and her sons for some years lived together as members of a joint Hindu family. On the 9th of January, 1836, in consideration of the sum of Rs. 2,801, one Ananta Rágholá conveyed, by deed of that date, the Vithalvádi property to Párvati, "widow and administratrix of the late Pándurang Mánkoji, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns." There is no evidence to show from what source the consideration money for that property was paid (exhibit No. 1).

In 1845 Vithobá Pándurang, having at that time received his share of his father's estate in cash or moveable property, separated from his mother and brothers, and executed a release. The fact of such separation is proved by the proceedings and decree in Suit No. 9 of 1874, in which Vithobá Pándurang was the plaintiff and Govind and Ganpatráv Pándurang were the defendants (exhibits B, C, D, and E). The release was not produced in that suit, and is not now forthcoming. It was in favour of Párvati (see exhibit G).

On the 24th of August, 1854, Rámchandra and Lakshman Dájibá bargained and sold to Párvati, "her heirs, executors, administrators and assigns," the Parel property above referred to, and certain other properties with which this suit is not concerned (exhibit No. 2). The consideration for the purchase was the sum of Rs. 8,452 paid in different sums by Párvati to her vendors. Párvati, in the portion of the deed in which the parties to it are described, is mentioned as being "the widow and administratrix of Pándurang Mánkoji, deceased."

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In 1854—the exact date is not in evidence—Govind Pándurang received his share in his father's estate, and separated from his mother and brother Ganpatráv, and passed a release to Párvati. This appears from an affidavit made by him in the Suit No. 9 of 1874, put in as exhibit C, and his written statement in Suit No. 392 of 1874 (exhibit G). Down to the date of his separation, Govind and his mother and brother Ganpatráv had lived together as members of a joint Hindu family, and when he separated, Ganpatráv and his mother continued to do so. The release which Govind executed is not in evidence.

In 1862, Párvati gave an equitable mortgage over the Vithalvádi and Parel properties to one Pestonji Dinshá. She died in 1871, intestate. Down to the time of her death she seems to have managed the joint property, or at least it was managed in her name. The defendant Ganpatráv says that after he began to earn his livelihood as a clerk in the Telegraph Department he paid his earnings, Rs. 100 *per mensem*, to Párvati. When she died, Ganpatráv continued in possession of all the property she had possessed or managed in her lifetime.

On the 15th August, 1874, Adarji Dádábhái, as assignee of the equitable mortgage created by Párvati in 1862, filed a suit, (No. 392 of 1874), against Vithobá, Govind, and Ganpatráv Pándurang for the purpose of establishing the mortgage, and praying for a sale of the property. He succeeded in establishing his claim to the extent of Rs. 6,000 for principal and interest[1]. Costs of suit were also awarded to him (exhibits H and I). It was for the purpose of satisfying the decree of the Appellate Court in Suit No. 392 of 1874 *(inter alia)* that the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang executed the mortgage of the 2nd June, 1879, (exhibit J), in favour of the first and second defendants which I have mentioned.

As the mortgaged premises were purchased by Párvati as executrix of Pándurang's estate and during her management of it, they must, in accordance with the ordinary presumption, be treated as forming a portion of that estate, and treated as if they had been purchased by Pándurang himself, notwithstanding the

(1) See I. L. R., 3 Bom., 312.

limitation to the heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns of Párvatibái.

The first question which arises is, whether the property, which came into the possession of Párvati upon the death of Pándurang Mánkoji, is to be treated, for the purpose of this suit, as having been the ancestral, or the self-acquired property of the latter. Actual proof upon this point there is none. If, in order that the plaintiffs should succeed in their suit it be necessary that the property left by Pándurang Mánkoji should be held to have been his ancestral property, it lies upon the plaintiffs to prove, in some way or other, that it was ancestral in his hands. There is no presumption in Hindu law upon the point which they can invoke in their favour. There is no presumption one way or the other. It is just as likely that Pándurang Mánkoji acquired the property which he died possessed of, as that Mánkoji or Mánkoji's father acquired it. There are faint indications, on the other hand, that the property was self-acquired by Pándurang, arising from the facts, that one of his brothers, Bháskar, left no property at all, and that Pándurang made a will of his property, which was recognized as a valid will, and acted upon as such by all his sons, which he could not have done effectually had his property not been self-acquired. These indications have, however, little, if any, probative force. The plaintiffs none the less have to make out their case upon this, as upon every other point; and, if they fail to do so, and this point is essential to their success, their suit must fail. I adopt to a considerable extent the views expressed in Mayne's Hindu Law, sec. 263. The mortgaged property must therefore, be treated in this suit as the self-acquired property of Pándurang Mánkoji, and as having passed under his will, since the plaintiffs have failed to prove the contrary.

The above proposition being established, it was not contended, by counsel for the plaintiffs, that the decision of the Appellate Court lately given in the case of *Jugmohandás Mangaldás* v. *Sir Mangaldás Nathubhái*[1] would not be applicable to the present case. From that decision it follows, I think necessarily, that Vithobá, Govind, and Ganpatráv Pándurang took whatever they

(1) I. L. R., 10 Bom., 528.

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became entitled to under their father's will, as their self-acquired property, but in co-parcenery according to Hindu law, and not as joint tenants according to English law. It is more difficult to determine what interest Párvati took in the property. It is open to argument, upon the authorities, that she took not more than an interest to endure during her life—*Mahomed Shumsool* v. *Shewukrám*[1].

The more correct construction, however, I hold to be that the will gave Párvati an equal interest with her sons in the testator's estate, liable to be defeated in the event of her death before the sons attained the age of twenty-one years, when they were to be entitled to claim their shares. On the sons claiming their shares, one share would be left with Párvati, and that share, subject to her incapacity, as a Hindu widow, to deal with immoveable property given her by her husband, would then become hers absolutely.

She did not, however, at that period remove her share from the common stock, nor did she ever attempt to separate her interest in the property from that of her sons. She managed for them, and was treated as the head of the family. It would perhaps be incorrect to speak of her as co-parcener with her sons, as their father would have been had he lived; but yet the family after his death acted exactly as if Pándurang had survived in Párvati. If Párvati had died before the separation of Vithobá, I cannot but think that her interest would have been treated as having lapsed for the benefit of the co-parceners, just in the same way as if one of the brothers had died childless. Vithobá took his share, and separated. The joint family continued upon the same basis. So, too, when Govind divided, Párvati and Ganpatráv continued to treat themselves as constituting a joint family. When Párvati died in 1871, her share in the joint property lapsed, I think, for the benefit of Ganpatráv. It does not seem, however, material to determine whether Ganpatráv took Párvati's share by survivorship or inheritance, as, if that share is ancestral in his hands in the event of his taking it by inheritance, it seems to me that it must be equally so in the event of his

(1) L. R., 2 Ind, App., 7.

taking it by survivorship. In the case of the father this is clearly so. A father and son possessed of no ancestral estate by their joint exertions acquire some property. The son's share in that property is self-acquired in his hands—*Chaturbhooj* v. *Dharamsi*[1]. The father dies, and his self-acquired share devolves on his son by survivorship. It cannot be but that the son takes that accretion to his share as ancestral. If just before his death the father had separated, and the son upon the father's death had taken his share, such share would be ancestral in the hands of the son. *A fortiori* must it be ancestral if the father dies joint with his son. Mr. Mayne discusses this question as between brothers at section 250 of his work practically the converse of this case.

The question, therefore, must be considered whether property which a son derives from his mother is ancestral in his hands when such property originally formed part of the father's estate. In the case of *Nund Coomár Láll* v. *Razecooddeen*[2] the Court adopted the following passage in West and Bühler, p. 323 (2nd ed.), as correctly expressing the law as to ancestral property:—"On the other hand, property inherited by a father from females, brothers, or collaterals, or directly from a great-great-grandfather, appears to be subject to the same rules as if self-acquired. Ancestral property, in fact, may be said to be co-extensive with the objects of the *apratibandhadáya*, or 'unobstructed inheritance'". The case before the Court related to property inherited, not from a mother, but from a collateral relation. In *Muttayan Chetti* v. *Sangili Vira*[3] the question arose as to the nature of a father's interest in a *zamindári* which, having been inherited by his mother from her father, devolved upon her death upon him. The Court came to the conclusion that property inherited through the mother is ancestral, and not self-acquired. In the beginning of the judgment they say (at p. 375): "It" (such property) "may not be ancestral in the sense in which property inherited by the father from the paternal grandfather is liable to partition under the Mitákshara Law at the instance of the son, but it is not self-acquired property, on that ground, for purposes other than

(1) I. L. R., 9 Bom., at pp. 445, 446. (2) 10 Beng. L. R., 183.
(3) I. L. R., 3 Mad., 371.

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those of partition." In that case it was sought after the death of the *zamindár* to establish a charge given by him over the *zamindári* as against the defendant, his son, and the right of the *zamindár* to alien the *zamindári* beyond his own lifetime was the point which the Court had to decide. The Court decided against the right. The case went on appeal to the Privy Council, and was reversed, on the ground that the debt, to secure which the charge was created, was not illegal or immoral, and that the decision in *Girdháree Lall's Case*(1) applied to it. As to the nature of the property, their Lordships said: "It was contended, on behalf of the plaintiff, first, that the *zamindári*, having descended to the defendant's father from his maternal grandfather, was his self-acquired property, or, at any rate, that he was not, as regards his son, under the same restrictions as to the alienation or hypothecation of the property as he would have been if it had descended to him from his father or paternal grandfather; secondly, that the whole *zamindári*, or at least the interest which the defendant took therein by heritage, was liable as assets by descent in the hands of the defendant, as the heir of his father, for the payment of his father's debts. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appellant is entitled to succeed upon the second ground, and they, therefore, think it unnecessary to express any opinion upon the first. Indeed, as the case has been argued before them on one side only, and the same question may hereafter be raised in some other case, they consider it right to abstain from expressing any opinion upon it, except that they concur with the High Court in holding that the property was not the self-acquired property of the defendant's father—*Muttayan Chettiar* v. *Sangili Vira Pándia Chinnatambiar*(2)."

Observing upon that case Mr. Mayne, after citing 3 Dig., 61, West and Bühler, p. 323, approved in *Nund Coomár Lall* v. *Razeeooddeen*(3), says (see Mayne's Hindu Law, (3rd ed.), page 240, *note*): "The High Court of Madras has held that property which descended to a man from his maternal grandfather was ancestral property, which he could not alienate to the detriment

(1) L. R., 1 Ind. App., 321. (2) L. R., 9 Ind. App., 128, at p. 143.
(3) 10 Beng. L. R., 183, at p. 192.

of his son. None of the above authorities were referred to; the decision was reversed by the Privy Council on another point. When the case arises again, it will be material to remember that property only becomes joint property by reason of being ancestral property when the ancestor, from whom it was derived, was a paternal ancestor. See Mit. i. I, secs. 3, 5, 21, 24, 27, 33; *i.* 5, secs. 2, 3, 5, 9—11." Messrs. West and Bühler's comment on the case is as follows:—"In a recent case the Privy Council have said that a *zamindári* inherited through a mother was not self-acquired property, but they expressed no opinion whether it was subject to the same restrictions on alienation or hypothecation as if it had descended to the *zamindár* from his father or grandfather. It may be concluded, therefore, that the more extensive construction of '*pitrarjit*' or 'ancestra will prevail, though probably without the consequence of giving to the son equal power with the father over such ancestral property, which is not in the stricter sense 'patrimonial' by "agnatic descent'"—West and Bühler's Hindu Law, pp. 714 and 715 (3rd ed). The learned authors of the work do not, however, adopt the distinction of the Madras Court as set out in the passage I have last cited from their judgment, which they regard as fanciful, and conclude their comment thus: 'The rules for partition of inherited property point to male lineal inheritance, leaving property owned in any other right to be distributed as self-acquired, or according to the special rules applicable on account of the character of the property as sacred or secular, or as affected or not with the support of public duties,'" p. 715.

I think I shall be acting most in accordance with the principles of Hindu law and with the weight of authority in holding that, in the present case, the interest which the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang derived from his mother Párvati in the properties in question is ancestral property in respect of which the plaintiffs have no present right of interference; and I shall, therefore, decree that the whole of the surplus proceeds of the mortgaged premises (if any), in the event of their being sold, be paid to the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang. In his hands they will remain of the same character as were the mortgaged premises them-

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selves. The agreement between the parties relieves me from the necessity of determining whether the plaintiffs have such an interest in the property as would technically have entitled them to maintain a properly constituted suit for their redemption.

The minutes of the decree will be as follows :—

Dismiss the suit as against the defendants Ganpatráv Govind and Moreshvar Govind, without costs. Order that, upon payment by the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang or the plaintiffs of the amount of the moneys which shall be found to be due to the first and second defendants at foot of their mortgage of the 2nd of June, 1879, with interest as therein provided, and their taxed costs of this suit within six months from the time when such amount shall be ascertained, the first and second defendants do reconvey the mortgaged premises to the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang; but, in the event of such payment being made in whole or in part by the plaintiffs, subject to a charge in their favour for the amount which they shall so have paid.

In default of such payment within the time given, let the mortgaged premises be sold. And out of the net proceeds of such sale let the first and second defendants be paid the aforesaid amount with interest and costs, and let the balance (if any), after paying thereout, firstly, the taxed costs of the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang and, secondly, of the plaintiffs, be paid to the defendant Ganpatráv Pándurang. No other order as to costs.

Attorneys for the plaintiffs :—Messrs. *Bálkrishna and Dikshit.*

Attorneys for the defendants :—Mr. *Mansukhlál M. Munshi*; Messrs. *Tyabji and Dáyábhái*, and Messrs. *Nánu and Hormasji.*