

1869

KELLY
v.
KELLY AND
SAUNDERS.

is not entitled to, or rather there is no ground for giving him compensation for, the loss of his wife's society; and that I think in matters of this kind ought to be treated as the principal element to be taken into account. And I also desire to avoid assessing the damages at a sum so great as might lead to their being thought vindictive. On the whole, it appears to me reasonable to order the co-respondent to pay the sum of rupees 1,000, as damages. He must also be decreed to pay the costs of the suit, which will be not only the petitioner's own costs, but the costs which the petitioner has incurred on behalf of the respondent. I was asked to settle the damages simultaneously with assessing them. Certainly the practice in England, as far as I can gather from the reported cases, has been to do this not earlier than the final decree. In one case it was made later, but the Judge Ordinary then observed that it ought to have been done at the time the decree was made absolute.

Application may be made for settlement and for access to the children when the decree is made absolute.

Attorneys for the petitioners: Messrs. *Robertson & Co.*

Attorney for the respondent: Baboo *D. C. Dutt.*

Attorney for the co-respondent: Mr. *Leslie.*

—————
Before Mr. Justice Phear.

RAICHARAN PAL v PYARI MANI DASÍ AND ANOTHER.

Hindu Law—Widow—Reversioner—Suit by Assignee.

1869
June 10.

During the existence of a Hindu widow's interest in an estate, the assignee of a reversionary heir to her husband has no interest therein, as such assignee, which will enable him to bring a suit to have a mortgage and decree affecting the estate set aside. This is so even though the assignee is the next reversionary heir to the husband after the assignor.

THIS suit was brought by the plaintiff as assignee of one Iswar Chandra Pal's right and title to certain property as the next reversionary heir after the determination of the first defendant's estate of a Hindu widow therein. The last full owner was Khettramohan Pal, who was alleged to have died intestate, and the plaintiff claimed after the death of the defendant

Pyari Mani, the widow of Khettramohan, to succeed to the property absolutely, by virtue of a deed of conveyance of the said property executed by Iswar Chandra in his favor, dated the 16th of April 1853. The defendant Pyari Mani disputed the plaintiff's title and set forth a will, purporting to have been made by her husband Khettramohan, by which, on attaining the age of 50 years, she became entitled to his estate absolutely. She further alleged that she had reached the age of 50 years, and that she had by virtue of the will executed a mortgage of part of the property to one Laknath Mullick.

1869
 RAICHARAN
 PAL
 v.
 PYARI MANI
 DASI.

The plaint prayed that Khettramohan might be declared to have died intestate; that on the death of the defendant Pyari Mani, the plaintiff should take the property absolutely; and that the mortgage by the defendant Pyari Mani should be set aside as regarded the plaintiff.

Mr. *Marindin* (Mr. *Branson* with him) for the defendants, raised the objection that the plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit, and referred to *Brojokishoree Dasi v. Srinath Bose* (1); *Gogunchandra Sen v. Joyadurga* (2) *Naikram Lal v. Surujbuns Sahi* (3).

Mr. *Graham* (Mr. *Evans* with him) for the plaintiff, contended that the case was decided by that of *Raicharan Pal v. Pyari-manî Dasi* (4), and that the plaintiff as reversionary heir could bring the suit.

PHEAR, J.—The first named defendant Pyari Mani is the widow of one Khettramohan Pal who died in Baisakh 1243 or 1244. Since that time she has been in enjoyment of her deceased husband's property for the estate of a Hindu widow. She has mortgaged a portion of that property to the second defendant, who has since brought a suit against her to obtain a sale of the property under the terms of the mortgage deed, and in that suit a consent decree has been made, Iswar chandra Pal is the next heir of Khettra-

(1) 9 W. R. 464.

(2) S. D. A., 1859, 620

(3) S. D. A., 1859, 891

(4) Mar. R., 622.

1869
 RAICHARAN
 PAL
 v.
 PYARI MANI
 DASI.

mohan now alive, that is, he stands in this position, that if Pyari Mani were to die now, Khettramohan's property would devolve upon him by inheritance. The plaintiff Raicharan Pal is a person to whom Iswar Chandra has granted his interest in that portion of Khettramohan's property, which is the subject of the mortgage to Laknath. In this character he comes into Court, on behalf of the ultimate heir of Khettramohan, to ask to have it declared that the mortgage and consent decree or transactions void as against the heirs of Khettramohan. The first question before me is whether Raicharan in this character is entitled to bring this suit. Mr. Graham urged that this matter was decided by the judgment of the High Court, in *Raicharan Pal v. Pyari-mani Dasi* (1). That suit was brought by this present plaintiff against Pyari Mani and other persons to set aside certain dealings of Pyari Mani with other portions of Khettramohan's property, and a Division Bench of this Court then held that Raicharan was entitled to bring that suit notwithstanding the objection that he was only Iswar Chandra's assignee. Now I do not think that that decision necessarily governs this case. There was fraud and collusion between Pyari Mani and Iswar against Raicharan, which gave him personally a right to a remedy of some sort, but whether that were so or not I cannot bring myself to agree with the reasoning of the Division Bench in that case, and the decision is not binding on me in such a sense that I am obliged to follow it. It appears to me that pending the existence of the widows's interest, the assignee of a Hindu Presumptive heir has no interest in the property of the deceased person of whom the assignor is the heir. He has only a personal right under his contract against his vendor, a right which he would be able no doubt to enforce against the vendor whenever the latter should come into enjoyment of the property by the death of the widow. It may be doubted whether he could enforce that contract against his vendor's sons, supposing the vendor died before the property fell in, and his issue took it after his death, for they would take not as heirs to their father but as heirs of the original proprietor. It is not necessary however

(1) Mar. R., 62.

that I should express any definite opinion on this point. While the widow is alive, she has, to use English terms, the whole estate of inheritance in her. It is now distinctly determined by a number of decisions on both sides of the Court that she has the whole inheritance, only that she is limited in her powers of alienating it. In this view Raicharan is in all respects a stranger to the property, and will remain so till the time comes when he can claim the benefit of his contract with Iswar Chandra. Therefore the principle laid down in *Brojo Kishori Dasi v. Srinath Bose* (1) applies to this case, and Raicharan has no right to bring the suit simply as assignee of Iswar Chandra. But then it is said that he is also the next heir after Iswar Chandra, and Iswar Chandra for some reason or other not coming forward to defend the estate for the benefit of the heirs, the person standing presumptively next in succession to him is entitled to do so. Now I think that proposition cannot be maintained except perhaps in certain very limited cases. The two decisions which have been referred to, *Gogun chandra Sen v. Joyadurga* (2), *Naikram Lal v. Surujbuns Sahi* (3), seem to establish this conclusion very decisively. Fraud on the part of the presumptive heir, that is to say fraud on his part against the ultimate heirs, (though I don't know well how that could be manifested) or incapacity, might for this purpose, put the presumptive heir out of the way, and give the next heir the character of representative of the ultimate heirs. But in this case there is nothing whatever to raise a suspicion of fraud on the part of Iswar Chandra, nothing to show he is incapable to act as protector of the estate if so disposed. So far as the facts are before me, he seems to live no further off than Benares and to be in communication with the members of the family here. There appears to be no reason why Raicharan should assume his office in relation to the estate. My conclusion, therefore, is that Raicharan's suit must be dismissed, on the ground that he had no right to bring it. However I feel it right, under the circum-

1869

RAICHARAN
PAL
v.
IYARI MANI
DASI.

(1) 9 W. R., 464.

(3) S. D. A., 891.

(2) S. D. A., 620.

1869

RAICHARAN
PAL
v.
PYARI MANI
D.A. I.

stances of this case, in the exercise of the large discretion reposed in this Court, not to give costs to the defendants. I am quite convinced that Pyari Mali founded her defence on a deliberate forgery. The evidence given to support the alienation on the ground of necessity broke down entirely. In my mind there was no hope of establishing the defendant's case in this respect by the evidence brought forward: nothing which would show that the widow was entitled to alienate, was in any degree made out, and I have no doubt Pyari Mani was well aware of this weakness, and that for the purpose of evading this difficulty, she or her adherents got that remarkable document fabricated. The document could hardly be said to have been proved by her evidence even if her case had disclosed no element of suspicion, but the fact that this document is brought forward now for the first time, after a lapse of thirty years, is one which it seems to me is impossible to be explained consistently with its genuineness. If it had really existed, it would, I am convinced, have been brought forward and filed in the very first of the many suits, which, during a long series of years, have been brought by or against Pyari Mani in reference to this property. The excuse suggested to account for this not having been done, is a very lame one. It is true that according to the terms of the document she would not obtain the absolute power of disposing of the property until she became fifty years of age, but still even this contingent right would have given her such moral strength in her position that she would assuredly not have failed to get the document upon the Nathi at the earliest opportunity. Or if they are so nice in regard to the reception of evidence in the Mofussil Courts as to lead this lady and her advisers to think it would have been useless to file this document it is certain that at least its existence would have been disclosed in the depositions of herself or some of her servants who have so often given evidence in cases of this kind. And further when I come to look closely at this document, it appears to me to present that peculiar condition of surface which is commonly seen in new deeds so prepared in this country as to bear the appearance of age. In short, I have no hesitation in saying that I believe the document to be a forgery deliberately made for

the purpose of bolstering up the case of the defendants; and I shall not allow the persons who rely on such a defence as this to have their costs, considering that the plaint is dismissed not on the merits, but on the peculiar ground which has been fatal to the plaintiff's case. The suit is therefore dismissed, each party paying their own costs.

Attorney for the plaintiff: Mr. *Paliologus*.

Attorneys for the defendants: Messrs, *Swinhoe & Co.*

Before Mr. Justice Phear.

KENNY v. THE ADMINISTRATOR-GENERAL OF BENGAL.

Equity of Redemption—Claimant—Agreement to Purchase.

The claimant entered into an agreement for the purchase of certain property; and on the execution of the agreement, deposited rupees 15,000 as earnest-money of the contract, and in part payment of the purchase money. The claimant was not satisfied at that time with the title deeds supplied by the vendor, but afterwards entered into fresh negotiations for the purchase upon different terms. The vendor died, and the present claim was filed in a suit to administer his estate. *Held*, that the claimant was entitled to be paid in full the rupees 15,000 in priority to all other creditors; and that his lien was not lost by the failure either of the original contract or the subsequent negotiations.

1869
June 15

In this administration suit a claim was made on behalf of Janokinath Mookerjee, the son of Rakhaldas Mookerjee of Burdwan, and S. M. Barada Sundari Debi, the mother and guardian of Bir Chand Mookerjee, the only other son of Rakhaldas Mookerjee. The claimants were representatives of Rakhaldas Mookerjee, who died in November 1868; and sought to recover 15,000 rupees, the amount of earnest-money paid by the deceased in respect of lands which he had contracted to buy.

About March 1868, negotiations were entered into between Thomas Kenny (since deceased) and Rakhaldas Mookerjee for the sale to the latter of property in Nuddea belonging to the former, and an agreement to that effect was come to between them.

At the time of the execution of the agreement, the sum of rupees 15,000 was paid by Rakhaldas Mookerjee to Thomas Kenny, as earnest-money and in part payment of the purchase-

1869
RAICHARAN
PAL
v.
PYARI MANI
DAEI.