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upon him; he had, therefore, gained no right of occupancy himself, and there are many decisions of this Court that the possession of the transferee cannot be added to the possession of the transferor. The last of these decisions is Hyder Buksh v. Bhubindro Deb N- Cowar (1), and the only decision to the contrary, Huro Chunder Goho v. Dunn (2), must, I think, be considered to be over-ruled.

The questions to be decided are, therefore, reduced to these two:—(i) Whether the right of occupancy which Krishna Das had at the time of the sale to the defendant was transferred to the defendant? And (ii) whether, if it was not so transferred

(1) Before Mr. Justice Bayley and Mr. Justice Mitter. The 1st February 1872.

HYDER BUKSH AND ANOTHER (DEFEN-DANTS) V. BHUBINDRO DEB COWAR PLAINTIFF).*

Right of Occupancy—Transfer—Act X of 1859. s. 6.

Baboo Debendro Narayan Bose for the appellants.

Baboos Doorga Mohun Doss and Bishen Doyal Roy for the respondent. THE judgment of the Court was

delivered by

MITTER, J.-We are of opinion that this special appeal ought to be dismissed. In order to establish a right of occupancy, it was necessary for the defendants to prove that they had been in possession of the disputed land ontinuously for a period of 12 years. The Judge in the Court below has found that they had been in possession for 11 years and 3 months only. It has been argued that the defendants are entitled to add to their own possession the possession of one Jesraj from whom they purchased the land in question. But under the provisions of s. 6, Act X of 1859, it appears to

be clear that they are not entitled to do so. "The possession of a father or other ancestor from whom a ryot inherits may be added" this \mathbf{in} manner; but not the possession of a vendor. It is true that the zemindar consented to the transfer, but such consent cannot give to the defenants any right higher than that possessed by their vendor, and as it appears from the facts of this case that the vendor was a mere tenant-at-will, and as, under the provisions of the section referred to, the defendants are not entitled to add to their own possession the possession of their vendor, this ground of appeal must fail.

The other ground as to the extent of the jote of Midni Bewa does not appear to be made out. It is clear from the *jama-wasil-baki* papers of the time of the Court of Wards, which have been put in by the plaintiff, as well as from other evidence, that Midni Bewa and Kadir Baksh held two distinct jotes, although the former had originally purchased from the latter an undivided half share of his jote.

We therefore dismiss this appeal with costs.

(2) 5 W. R., Act X Rul., 55.

*Special Appeal, No. 1252 of 1871, against adecree of the Judge of Zilla Rungpore, dated the 31st May 1871, reversing a decree of the subordinate Judge of that district, dated the 15 May 1869.

1874

NARENDRA NARAYAN ROY t CHOWDHRY v.

Ishan Chandra Sen. is it still existence in Krishna Das or his heirs, and being in existence, will it prevent the plaintiff from ejecting the defendant ? NARENDRA

The first of these questions has been not unfrequently said to NABAYAN ROT CHOWDHRY have been decided by a Full Bench in the case of Ajoodhia Persadv. Emambandee Begum (1); and if that had been the case, this reference would have been unnecessary. But this case decides a totally different point, as may be seen by considering the circumstances out of which it arose. The defendant held a non-transferable tenure, and he had held it for more than twelve years. He then attempted to tranfer it, but the zemindar refused to recognize the transfer, and sued him for his rent. The argument for the defendant was that, because he had gained a right of occupancy, therefore that which was a non-transferable tenure had become a transferable one, and that, therefore, his liability ceased. The question was not referred because there were any conflicting decisions upon the point; but because of its importance, and as pointed out by the Full Bench, no cases had ever gone to this extent. No argument appears to me necessary to show that this decision has no bearing upon the subject now under consideration.

Of the other cases the following have been relied upon in favor of the transferability of the tenure : Mussamut Taramonee Dossee v. Birressur Mozoomdar (2), Juggut Chunder Roy v. Ramnarain Bhuttacharjee (3), and Nunku Roy v. Mahabir **Prasad** (4). The following have been relied on for the opposite view : Dinabumdhoo Dey v. Ramdhone Roy (5), Rani Durga Sundari v. Brindaban Chandra Sirkar Chowdhry (6), Tarapersad Roy v. Soorjokanto Acharjee Chowdhry (7), and Hyder Buksh v. Bhubindro Deb Cowar (8). It is not easy in all these cases to be quite sure of the grounds on which they proceed, but it is not, we think, possible to reconcile them all.

Besides these cases it may be convenient to refer to cases in which it has been held that the ryot by sub-letting his land does not

(1) B. L. R., Sup. Vol., 725. (2) I W. B., 86. (3) Id., 126 (4)3 B. L. R., App., 35.

(5) 9 W. B., 522. (6) 2 B. L. R., App., 37 (7) Post, p. 281. (8) Ante, p. 276.

1874

ISHAN CHAN. DEA SEN;

1874	determne his right of occupancy	-Kalee Kishoree Chatterjee v.
NARENDRA	Ram Churn Shah (1), Haran (Chandra Pal v. Mukta Sund-
NARENDRA NARA VAN ROV	dari Chowdhrain (2), and Jamir	· Gazi v. Goneye Mundul (3).
CHOWDERY		
v.	(1) 9 W. R., 344.	wise not so (a). He further held that as
Ishan Chan-	•	the former ryots, lessors of the plain-
URA SEN.	(3) Before Mr. Justice Loch and	tiffs, had left the land, the defendants,

The 10th June 1869.

Mr. Justice Mitter.

JAMIR GAZI AND ANOTHER (PLAIN-TIFFS) v. GONEYE MUNDUL AND OTHERS (DEFENDANTS),*

Right af Occupancy-Lease-Abandonment.

Baboo Bhowani Churn Dutt for the appellants.

Baboo Abhai Churn Bose for the respondents.

delivered by

Loca, J.-We think the judgment of the lower Court must be reversed The plaintiffs state that they obtained a lease from Jakir Gazi and Bazi Bewa, who are ryots having a right of occupancy; that they have been ousted by the defendants; and that they now seek to recover possession under the terms of their lease.

The Judge has reversed the order of the first Court, apparently on the ground that the lessors of the plaintiffs were not entitled to grant them a lease; that such lease would be a transfer of their rights ; that it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that a right of occupancy does not make a jote transferable if other-

zemindars, were entitled to enter upon it, as raled by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Joy Kishen Mookerjee v. Raj Kishen Mookerjee (b).

We think the Full Bench Ruling quoted by the Judge is quite inapplicable to this case. That related to the sale of a tenure in which the tenant had merely acquired a right of occupancy, and the Court then held that a mere fact of occupation for twelve years would not alter the nature of that jote, and would not make transferable what was not so in its orgin. But it is evident from the terms of s. 6, Act THE judgment of the Court was X of 1859, and from the judgments of this Court (one of which in the case of Kalee Kishore Chatterjee v. Ram Churn Shah, (c) has been quoted to us by the respondent) that a tenant having a right of occupancy can create a lease, and that the lessee from him is entitled to hold the land, under the terms of the lease. If therefore the zemindar, who is entitled to receive the rents of the land from the ryots having a right of occupancy, do eject their lessees, there can be no doubt that such lessees have a right to recover possession under the terms of their lease, the zemindar being entitled to nothing but the amount of rent which the ryots who hold from him immediately have agreed to pay.

(a) Ajoodhia Persad v. Emamlandee Begum, B. L. R., Sup. Vol., 725.

(b) 5 W. R., 147. (c) 9 W. R., 344.

*Special Appeal, No.2252 of 1868, against a decree of the Officiating Additional Judge of Zilla Jessore, dated the 23rd May 1868, reversing a decree of theSudder Munsif of that district: dated 9th April 1867.