Certificate to collect Debts-Refusal to grant Certificate-Appeal-Act XXVII. of 1869.

No appeal lies from an order of a District Judge refusing to grant a certificate under Act XXVII, of 1869.

Mactier, Judge of the District of Sátárá, refusing to grant a certificate, under Act XXVII. of 1830, to enable the petitioners to collect the debts due to their deceased father, Krishnáji Báji Bhágvat. The refusal was based upon the fact that a certificate to administer the property of the deceased had already been granted to his eldest son under Reg. VIII. of 1827.

The application was heard by LLOYD and KEMBALL, JJ.

Nagindas Tulsidas, for the appellants :- This appeal is brought under Sec. 6 of Act XXVII. of 1860. [LLOYD, J. :- Sec. 6 says "the granting of such certificate may be suspended by an appeal to the Sudder Court;" but it does not say that an appeal shall lie to the Sadr Court against the refusal by the District Judge to grant a certificate, nor does any such inference follow.] "Granting a certificate" necessarily includes the refusal to grant it. An appeal must be against some order; that order may be for granting, or for refusing to grant, a request made, there cannot, in the very nature of the thing, be an appeal by the man whose request is granted. Therefore, the appeal, which Sec. 6 undoubtedly gives, must be by the person whose request is refused. Moreover, the section gives the Sadr Court power to declare the party to whom the certificate should be granted. This evidently means that this Court can order a certificate to be granted to a person to whom the District Judge has refused it. Now, how is this court to proceed ? It cannot preced ex mero motu. It must, therefore, proceed upon the application of the losing party.

1870.

Jane 24.

 $\begin{array}{c|c} 1870. \\ \hline In \ re \\ Vishvanath \\ Hari \\ et \ al. \end{array} \begin{array}{c} Per CORIAM: \\ \hline The Court is of opinion that it is discre$ tionary with the District Judge to grant or to refuse a certificate under Act XXVII. of 1860, and that, if he has refused to grant a certificate, no appeal lies, under Sec. 6 of the $Act, against his order. \end{array}$

Appeal dismissed.

June 27.

Special Appeal No. 104 of 1870.

	KU	
Amritá bin Jot	۲	Respondent.

Pátilki Watan-Eldership-Act XI. of 1843-Jurisdiction.

Where the plaintiff sued to be declared entitled to the office of Mulki Patil in the village of Kotávery, as being the senior of his family, and alleged that the defendant, the actual incumbent of that office, had no right to share in the management of the *watan*, and had, in fact, until 1866, upon the death of the father of the plaintiff, never done so, it was held that the Civil Courts had jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the plaintiff.

Abaji bin Sankroji v. Niloji bin Baloji (a) distinguished.

THIS was a special appeal from the decision of R. F. Mactier, District Judge of Sátárá, in appeal Suit No. 196 of 1869, reversing the decree of the Munsif of Máyani.

The plaintiff, Vithu bin Mánku, sued to obtain a declaration that he was the vadil (senior) in his family, and, as such, entitled to hold permanently the office of mulki patil in his village, Kotávery. He stated that the watan had been in his family for more than one handred years, till the death of his father in 1866, when the revenue authorities made the defendant patil, and referred the plaintiff to the Civil Court. He, therefore, brought this suit to have his right to the watan declared, and to be declared entitled to do the work, take the proceeds, and enjoy the manpan.

The defendant answered that the plaintifn was a stranger to the watan, which belonged to him, the defendant, as vadil or senior, and that the duties vested in him as such.

(a) 2 Bom. H. C. Rep. 363 (342, 2nd ed.)