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INTERNATIONAL LAW

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INTRODUCTION

IN RECENT times, India is witnessing the reliance on international laws being used by the Indian courts to address certain grave issues of the society, where there are certain loopholes in the laws framed by the Legislature. Because it inherited a Common Law System, India refers to foreign laws to interpret its own laws. There are certain instances, where the Indian courts have found or have referred to international conventions and have addressed or directed the respective authority, with regards to the international conventions mentioned. The Indian Constitution and as per various judicial pronouncements, international law is not considered domestic or national law unless legislation to that effect has been passed by an Indian legislature. Thus an international treaty is not enforceable in India unless it has been ratified by the Parliament. In this regard India follows the 'dualist' theory of law, that is, international laws or international treaties help India formulate laws or set benchmarks with an objective in mind. It is of great importance to the courts of India, so as to help the judiciary, in time of need. In this regard it becomes pertinent to mention the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 which regulates all aspects of treaty making between states. While India has not ratified this convention yet, the Supreme Court has recognized its customary status. In this regard it is important to note that under law is different from national law unlike the 'monist' theory which stipulates that international law automatically becomes national law.

II APPROACH OF THE SUPREME COURT

In the matter of *Arjun Gopal v. Union of India*¹ the Supreme Court ruled out imposing a complete ban on the sale of firecrackers during Diwali but put certain conditions in place for the sale and use of firecrackers. The court has acknowledged the alarming degradation of the air quality, leading to severe air pollution in the city of Delhi and accepts that there are number of reasons which have contributed to poor air quality in Delhi and National Capital Region (NCR). At the same time, it is emphasised that air pollution hits its nadir during Diwali time because of indiscriminate

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1 AIR 2018 SC 5731.

use of firecrackers, the chemical composition whereof increases harmful particulate matters such as PM2.5 or PM10 at alarming level thereby bringing the situation of 'emergency'.

Supreme Court directs that crackers with reduced emission (improved crackers) and green crackers only would be permitted to be manufactured and sold. Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation (PESO) is directed to review the clinical composition of fireworks, particularly reducing aluminium content, and shall submit its report in respect thereof within a period of two weeks from today. For undertaking this exercise, PESO would also associate Fireworks Research and Development Centre (FRDC).

As there has been a lot of hue and cry in the international community regarding protection of the environment and thus even the apex court pronounced its judgment citing various international environmental conventions and protocols, *viz.*, Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, 1972 and more specifically the "precautionary principle", and this was reiterated in the Rio Conference of 1992 in its Principle 15.² The principle of precaution involves the anticipation of environmental harm and taking measures to avoid it or to choose the least environmentally harmful activity. It is based on scientific uncertainty. Environmental protection should not only aim at protecting health, property and economic interest but also protect the environment for its own sake. Precautionary duties must not only be triggered by the suspicion of concrete danger but also by (justified) concern or risk potential. The precautionary principle was recommended by the UNEP Governing Council (1989).

In the landmark case of *Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India*,³ the Supreme Court of India held that right to die with dignity is a fundamental right. The five judge bench also held that passive euthanasia and a living will also legally valid. The court issued detailed guidelines in this regard. The bench also held that the right to live with dignity also includes the smoothening of the process of dying in case of a terminally ill patient or a person in persistent vegetative state with no hope of recovery.

This ruling thus permits the removal of life-support systems for the terminally ill or those in incurable comas. The court also permitted individuals to decide against artificial life support, should the need arise by creating a living will. The court while pronouncing the judgement resorted to several international law conventions and foreign judgments.

2 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, Principle 15: In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for proposing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. Available at: <http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/precaution-7.html> (last visited on Nov. 10, 2019).

3 AIR 2018 SC 1665.

The right to life under article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976 (ICCPR) provides that every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. The second sentence of article 6(1) imposes a positive obligation on the states to provide legal protection of the right to life. However, the subsequent reference to life not being 'arbitrarily deprived' operates to limit the scope of the right (and therefore the states' duty to ensure the right). Comments from the United Nations Human Rights Committee suggest that laws allowing for voluntary euthanasia are not necessarily incompatible with the states' obligation to protect the right to life.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee has emphasized that laws allowing for euthanasia must provide effective procedural safeguards against abuse if they are to be compatible with the state's obligation to protect the right to life. In 2002, the United Nations Committee considered the euthanasia law introduced in the Netherlands. The committee stated that:⁴

where a State party seeks to relax legal protection with respect to an act deliberately intended to put an end to human life, the Committee believes that the Covenant obliges it to apply the most rigorous scrutiny to determine whether the State party's obligations to ensure the right to life are being complied with

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has adopted a similar position to the United Nations Human Rights Committee when considering euthanasia laws and the right to life in article 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). In *Pretty v. United Kingdom*⁵ the ECHR ruled that the decision of the applicant to avoid what she considered would be an undignified and distressing end to her life was part of the private sphere covered by the scope of article 8 of the Convention. The court affirmed that the right of an individual to decide how and when to end her life, provided that the said individual was in a position to make up her own mind in that respect and to take the appropriate action, was one aspect of the right to respect for private life under article 8 of the Convention.⁶

Accordingly, the ECHR concluded that, the right to life guaranteed by article 2 of the Convention obliges states to establish a procedure capable of ensuring that a decision to end one's life does indeed correspond to the free will of the individual concerned.

In a recent decision regarding end of life issues, *Lambert v. France*,⁷ the ECHR considered whether the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration of Vincent Lambert violated the right to life in article 2. Vincent Lambert was involved in a serious road accident which left him tetraplegic and with permanent brain damage.

4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976, art.2 and 6.

5 [2002] ECHR 423 (April 29, 2002).

6 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights art. 8 provides a right to respect for one's "private and family life, his home and his correspondence", subject to certain restrictions that are "in accordance with law" and "necessary in a democratic society".

7 [2015] ECHR 185.

He was assessed in expert medical reports as being in a chronic vegetative state that required artificial nutrition and hydration to be administered via a gastric tube. Lambert's parents applied to the ECHR alleging that the decision to withdraw his artificial nutrition and hydration breached, *inter alia*, the state's obligations under article 2 of the European Convention. The ECHR highlighted that article 2 imposes on the states both a negative obligation (to refrain from the 'intentional' taking of life) and a positive obligation (to 'take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction'). The court held that the decision of a doctor to discontinue life-sustaining treatment (or 'therapeutic abstention') did not involve the state's negative obligation under article 2 and, therefore, the only question for the court under article 2 was whether it was consistent with the state's positive obligation.

The ECHR emphasized that 'the Convention has to be read as a whole', and, therefore, in a case such as the present one reference should be made, in examining a possible violation of article 2, to article 8 of the Convention and to the right to respect for private life and the notion of personal autonomy which it encompasses.

Thus, the ECHR in the *Lambert v. France* case struck the balance between the sanctity of life on the one hand and the notions of quality of life and individual autonomy on the other. The subject of euthanasia is quite controversial and raises an array of sophisticated moral, ethical, social, philosophical, legal and religious concerns. Broadly there are two groups formed whenever euthanasia is discussed. The first group is of religion notably Christianity and Islam which don't recognize a right to die, believing life to be a divine gift.

Second group relates to the requirement of consent. The capacity of terminally-ill patients to give informed consent for their own killing is often questioned. As a reason in past there have been many campaigns relating to euthanasia some for its support whereas others for its withdrawal. However taking into account the interest of people laws have been laid down in support of euthanasia. This is against the religious beliefs, but for the benefit of society. This shows the clash of law and religion. It has been observed many a times that law remains ahead of society and religion stays behind the society.

Thus, it can be said that this is a judgment in right direction. Those suffering from chronic diseases are often subjected to cruel treatments. Denying them the right to die in a dignified manner extends their suffering. Hence, the court is right in declaring right to die with dignity is a fundamental right as it will help in reducing the pains of those suffering from chronic treatments and they will be able to die in a dignified manner.

The Supreme Court delivered one of the most keenly awaited and historic judgment in the case of *Indian Young Lawyer's Association v. State of Kerala*.⁸ (*Sabarimala* case), by a 4:1 majority, the court permitted entry of women of all age groups to the Sabarimala temple, holding that 'devotion cannot be subjected to gender discrimination'. Sabarimala Sree Dharmasastha Temple is a temple complex located

at Sabarimala inside Periyar Tiger Reserve in Pathanamthitta District, Kerala, India. It is the largest annual pilgrimage in the world with an estimate of between 17 million and 50 million devotees visiting every year. The temple is dedicated to the Hindu celibate deity Ayyappan also known as *Dharma Sastha*, who according to belief is the son of Shiva and feminine incarnation of Vishnu. The deity in Sabarimala temple is in the form of a Yogi or a Bramchari according to the Thanthri of the temple. The God in Sabarimala is in the form of a Naisthik Bramchari, and this is the reason why young women are not permitted to offer prayers in the temple. Since the deity is in the form of a Naisthik Brahmachari, it is therefore believed that young women should not offer worship in the temple so that even the slightest deviation from celibacy and austerity observed by the deity is not caused by the presence of such women.

The exclusion of (a class of) women from the Sabarimala temple was justified on the basis of ancient custom, which was sanctioned by rule 3(b), framed by the government under the authority of the 1965 Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorisation of Entry Act). Section 3 of the Act required that places of public worship be open to all sections and classes of Hindus, subject to special rules for religious denominations. Rule 3(b), however, provided for the exclusion of “women at such time during which they are not by custom and usage allowed to enter a place of public worship.” These pieces of legislation were juxtaposed against constitutional provisions such as article 25(1) (freedom of worship), article 26 (freedom of religious denominations to regulate their own practices), and articles 14 and 15(1) (equality and non-discrimination).

In response to a public interest litigation filed in 1991, the High Court of Kerala had judged that the restriction of entry of women ages 10-50 to the temple was in accordance with the usage prevalent from time immemorial, to uphold the customary traditions of the temple.

However, on September 28, 2018, the Supreme Court of India overturned the restriction on the entry of women, declaring it unconstitutional and discriminatory. The Supreme Court had ruled that women, of all age groups, can enter Sabarimala temple in Kerala. The apex court in a 4:1 majority said that the temple practice violates the rights of Hindu women and that banning entry of women to shrine is gender discrimination.

The court in its judgement held that the Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the fact that India is a party to this Convention for emphasizing that it is the obligation of the state to eradicate taboos relating to menstruation based on customs or traditions and further the state should refrain from invoking the plea of custom or tradition to avoid their obligation. The court also stated that international conventions must be followed when there is a void in the domestic law or when there is any inconsistency in the norms for construing the domestic law.

In 2017, various individuals and groups (including Swapnil Trapathi, Indira Jaising, Mathews J. Nedumpara and the Centre for Accountability and Systemic Change) filed petitions before the Supreme Court of India under article 32 of the

Constitution seeking a declaration that “Supreme Court case proceedings of ‘constitutional importance having an impact on the public at large or a large number of people’ should be live streamed in manner that is easily accessible for public viewing” (para. 1). In addition, they sought guidelines from the court to enable the future determination of cases that would qualify for live streaming. The petitioners based their argument on the 1996 Supreme Court case of *Naresh Shridhar Mirjkar v. State of Maharashtra*⁹ which had held that article 19 of the Constitution included the right of journalists to publish reports of court proceedings. In that case the Supreme Court had emphasized, “the efficacy of open trials for upholding the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Courts and for enhancement of public confidence and support.”

The court, in 2018, in a landmark judgment in the case *Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India*,¹⁰ upheld the plea of the petitioners and allowed live streaming of court proceedings in the interest of the public, especially law students and interns. The court while delivering its judgment undertook a thorough comparative analysis of the use of live streaming in other jurisdictions. It noted that Australia begun including audio-visual recordings of all high court (their apex court) proceedings on its website from October 1, 2013. However, these proceedings are not live, but are made available within a couple of days of the proceedings. The lower courts in Australia have no set rules on broadcasting. In Brazil the judiciary owns a television and radio station on which Supreme Court and superior court of justice proceedings are broadcast. There is also a YouTube channel which broadcasts the Supreme Court proceedings. The Canadian Supreme Court proceedings have been broadcast on a dedicated television channel since 1994 and have been streamed on the court websites since 2009, and the lower courts make broadcast decisions on a case-to-case basis. In China, live streaming and recorded broadcast is being introduced across the judiciary. Legislation in 2005 in England ended the criminalization of recording court proceedings and allowed the broadcast and live streaming of Supreme Court hearings in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The ECHR proceedings are broadcast on the court’s website, the International Criminal Court has delayed streaming to allow the redaction of confidential information and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia has a YouTube channel and social media accounts with various clips from proceedings. Although Germany allows broadcast of proceedings this is subject to strict legislative restrictions. Ireland allows broadcast of proceedings, but this is on a case-by-case basis and is rarely used. In Israel live broadcasting has been allowed since 2014. New Zealand has guidelines which govern the broadcast of their court proceedings. In South Africa the right to freedom of expression was used to allow for the broadcast of criminal matters and the Supreme Court of Appeal set out guidelines to be considered by Courts in determining whether to allow broadcast of specific cases. The United States Supreme Court has allowed oral recordings of its hearings since 1955 but does not allow video broadcasting, and lower courts allow broadcast subject to guidelines.

9 [1966] 3 S.C.R 744.

10 AIR 2018 SC 4806.

The court referred to the guidelines proposed by the attorney general to govern the live streaming of proceedings in India and stated that it agreed with them in general. It noted that the process should be executed in a, “progressive, structured and phased manner, with certain safeguards to ensure that the purpose of live streaming of proceedings is achieved holistically and that it does not interfere with the administration of justice or the dignity and majesty of the Court”

In its concluding remarks, the Supreme Court quoted Bentham, “In the darkness of secrecy sinister interest, and evil in every shape, have full swing. Only in proportion as publicity has place can any of the checks applicable to judicial injustice operate. Where there is no publicity there is no justice. Publicity is the very soul of justice. It is the keenest spur to exertion, and surest of all guards against improbity. It keeps the Judge himself while trying under trial (in the sense that) the security of securities is publicity.”¹¹

The court was hearing petition filed by National Commission for Protection of Human Rights (NCPCR), in the case of *National Commission for Protection of Child Rights v. Rajesh Kumar*.¹² The NCPCR was aggrieved over the order of High Court of Calcutta. NCPCR and West Bengal government were at odds in the high court over the trafficking of 17 children from an orphanage in Jalpaiguri.

It was contended before the high court that that the writ petitioner had received summons dated July 20, 2017, from the NCPCR and replied thereto informing that the West Bengal State Commission for Protection of Child Rights had been informed with regard to such incidents and the said Commission had already taken cognizance of the matter and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the National Commission is barred under section 13(2) of the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005. Jurisdiction of NCPCR also became matter of debate as high court had accepted the said contention and had opined that the matter was required to be debated and, accordingly, had issued notice and directed the National Commission to file an affidavit and further not to proceed with the matter.

The NCPCR held local administration responsible for continuous of vicious cycle of trafficking racket but the state government questioned its jurisdiction. After hearing the matter today, the apex court decided to broaden the horizons of petition and said that it would scrutinize the affairs of orphan homes across the country. The bench referred to the provisions of the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 which lay down that children cannot be abandoned or parted away at whims and fancies of the person-in-charge of orphanages.

The court mentioned other international human rights conventions and covenants in its judgment and stated “human rights” means the rights relating to life, liberty, equality and dignity of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in the international covenants and enforceable by courts in India.

11 *Scott v. Scott* (1911) All. E.R. 1, 30

12 2018(1) SCALE 418.

Underscoring the importance of rights of children in society as sacred and holding future of country dependent upon destiny of its children, the Chief Justice of India (CJI) observed, “A right of a child in a society is sacred, for the future of the country depends upon the character and the destiny of a child and the State has a great role in that regard. It is in the realm of protection.” CJI further said that nothing is more disastrous than children being sold and such a situation cannot be allowed to prevail.

In *Joseph Shine v. Union of India*,¹³ Joseph Shine, a non-resident Keralite, in October 2017 filed public interest litigation under article 32 of the Constitution. The petition challenged the constitutionality of the offence of adultery under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with section 198(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973. Section 497 IPC which was challenged, criminalized adultery by imposing culpability on a man who engages in sexual intercourse with another person’s wife. Adultery was punishable with a maximum imprisonment of five years. Women, including consenting parties, were exempted from prosecution. Further a married woman could not bring forth a complaint under section 497 IPC when her husband engaged in sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman. This was in view of section 198(2) of Cr PC which specified how a complainant can file charges for offenses committed under section 497 and 498 IPC.

The apex court on September 27, 2018 struck down section 497 as unconstitutional being violative of article 14, 15 and 21 of the constitution and held that section 198(2) of Cr PC shall be unconstitutional to the extent that it is applicable to section 497 IPC.

The court took into consideration the following matters while passing this landmark judgment, that the autonomy of an individual to make his or her choices with respect to his/her sexuality is the most intimate choice of life and should be protected from public censure through criminal sanction. A wrong punishable with criminal sanctions must be a public wrong against the society as a whole and not merely an act committed against an individual victim. There cannot be a patriarchal monarchy over the daughter or, for that matter, husband’s monarchy over the wife. And there cannot be a community exposition of masculine dominance. Section 497 is a pre-constitutional law which was enacted in 1860. There would be no presumption of constitutionality in a pre-constitutional law (like section 497) framed by a foreign legislature. The provision would have to be tested on the anvil of Part III of the Constitution. Thinking of adultery from the point of view of criminality would be a retrograde step. This court has travelled on the path of transformative constitutionalism and, therefore, it is absolutely inappropriate to sit in a time machine to a different era where the machine moves on the path of regression. Hence, to treat adultery as a crime would be unwarranted in law. The right to live with dignity includes the right not to be subjected to public censure and punishment by the state except where absolutely necessary. In order to determine what conduct requires state interference through criminal sanction, the state must consider whether the civil remedy will serve the purpose and should examine the impact of such conduct on the society.

13 AIR 2018 SC 4898.

