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DISABILITY LAW*V. K. Ahuja**

I INTRODUCTION

DISABILITY RIGHTS in India have increasingly moved from the margins to the mainstream of constitutional and social justice debates, driven in large part by a growing body of judicial decisions that recognise the everyday barriers faced by persons with disabilities. Courts across the country have been called upon to address discrimination in films, inaccessibility in public services, exclusion in education and employment, and systemic failures in the implementation of statutory reservations. The cases that follow in 2024 illustrate how the judiciary is shaping a more inclusive and rights-driven understanding of disability, one that emphasises dignity, equality, and meaningful participation rather than charity or tokenism. Together, they mark a significant shift towards treating disability as a question of justice, fairness, and enforceable legal entitlements.

II WORDS CARRY WEIGHT

The Supreme Court's decision in *Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures Films India Pvt. Ltd.*¹ sparks a constitutional debate over the tension between freedom of expression and dignity-based equality, particularly for persons with disabilities (PwD). The case raised the question: Can cinematic humour or creative freedom justify stereotypes that dehumanise a marginalised group? At the heart of the controversy lay Sony Pictures' film 'Aankh Micholi', which portrayed characters with disabilities using terms like 'soundproof system' and 'atki hui cassette'. The appellant, Nipun Malhotra, a noted disability rights activist, alleged that such depictions violated the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (RPwD Act) and the constitutional guarantee of dignity under articles 14, 15, and 21.

Nipun Malhotra, who has arthrogryposis, objected to the derogatory and inaccurate representation of persons with disabilities in the movie's trailer and content. The High Court of Delhi dismissed his petition, holding it non-maintainable since the film had already received a 'U' certification by the CBFC which is an expert body constituted under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and that the appellant

* Director and Senior Professor, The Indian Law Institute New Delhi. The research assistance rendered by Ayushi Verma is respectfully acknowledged.

1 2024 INSC 465.

had not contested Sony Pictures' explanation that the movie's overarching message revolved around "overcoming disability" and "highlighting the strengths of persons with disabilities." On appeal, the Supreme Court clarified that the certification of the film was not in issue. As the film had already been released, the appellant did not seriously challenge the CBFC's decision. Instead, the appeal focused on two broader concerns:

- i. The need to frame guidelines for filmmakers dealing with sensitive subjects such as disability, and
- ii. The desirability of including subject-matter experts on disability within the CBFC's examining and advisory panels.

Thus, the court's inquiry moved beyond the individual film to address the systemic question of representation, stereotyping, and free speech in visual media. Under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, every film must be certified before public exhibition.² The 1991 Guidelines require that scenes showing abuse or ridicule of physically or mentally disabled persons should not be shown needlessly.³ The RPwD Act, 2016, embodies the social model of disability, treating disability as a function of social and environmental barriers rather than individual impairments. Section 3(1) guarantees equality, dignity, and respect for the integrity of persons with disabilities, aligning Indian law with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The court placed this Act at the centre of its interpretive exercise, reading cinematic representation as a potential site of discrimination and exclusion. Drawing on the work of Jeremy Waldron and John Stuart Mill, the court distinguished between speech that offends sensibilities and that which undermines dignity. Justice Chandrachud emphasised that derogatory portrayals of marginalised groups, including persons with disabilities, prejudice their dignity and further disenfranchise them. Freedom of expression, while precious, "cannot include the freedom to lampoon or misrepresent those already marginalised."

Films, as a powerful form of speech, enjoy constitutional protection under article 19(1)(a), subject to reasonable restrictions under article 19(2). Referring to *K.A. In Abbas v. Union of India*⁴ and *Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon*, the court reaffirmed that restraints on cinematic expression must be extremely narrow, and only depictions that glorify social evils or reinforce systemic prejudice fall outside the protection. However, unlike obscenity or morality cases, the court conducted a context-and-impact analysis, asking whether a film's overall message entrenches harmful stereotypes or instead promotes awareness and empathy. Rejecting the notion of absolute censorship, the court held that the creative freedom of film-makers and the right to dignity of persons with disabilities are not necessarily in conflict. When a film's overall message promotes inclusion or resilience, isolated depictions should not attract judicial censure. However,

2 Cinematograph Act, 1952, s. 3-5.

3 Guidelines for Certification of Films for Public Exhibition, 1991.

4 1970 2 SCC 780.

where the core narrative reinforces inequality, article 19(1) (a) offers no refuge. The court made the following important observations:

25. Restraints on films are founded on principles of due process, social interest, limited application in cases of absolute necessity and clear purpose of the restraint. Among the principles which must be borne in mind when deciding the fitness of a film for public exhibition include the following: (i) Social impact of the film is judged from the perspective of an ordinary person of reasonable intelligence and not a hypersensitive person; (ii) Social change, rather than orthodox notions or what is right and moral must be borne in mind; and (iii) The film must be judged by its overall message and not from isolated depictions of social evils.

The judgment's most striking contribution lies in distinguishing between *Disabling Humour* and *Disability Humour*. 'Disabling Humour' demeans or objectifies persons with disabilities, reducing them to ridicule or pity, whereas 'Disability Humour' reclaims narrative agency, using humour to challenge ableist norms and normalise difference. The court found that the appellant had not rebutted Sony Pictures' clarification that the film's ultimate message celebrated resilience rather than ridicule. Thus, the reliefs sought, such as "beeping" specific dialogues or compelling the producer to create an awareness film, were declined as unconstitutional forms of compelled speech. The court recognised the structural harm of stereotyping but refrained from issuing enforceable guidelines or institutional reforms. This restraint, though consistent with the separation of powers, leaves implementation to executive discretion. By framing the debate as one between speech that empowers and speech that disenfranchises, the court redefined artistic liberty through the lens of empathy, dignity, and inclusion. In doing so, it charted a new jurisprudential pathway where art remains free, but never free to ridicule.

III BENCHMARK VERSUS FUNCTIONAL COMPETENCE

The Supreme Court in *Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India*,⁵ marks another vital stride in India's developing jurisprudence on disability rights and inclusive education. The appellant, a candidate with a 44–45% speech and language disability resulting from a repaired bilateral cleft palate, had qualified for NEET-UG 2024 and sought admission to the MBBS course under the PwD category. However, the Disability Assessment Board at Sir J.J. Group of Hospitals declared him ineligible, citing the National Medical Commission's (NMC) Appendix H-1 to the 2019 Regulations, which categorically disqualified candidates with 40% or more speech and language disability. The High Court of Bombay declined interim relief, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court, which not only allowed the appellant's admission but delivered a rich judgment on the interpretation of disability law in higher education.

5 2024 INSC 775.

The question before the court was whether a candidate can be disqualified from admission merely because the quantified percentage of disability marginally exceeds 40%. It answered this with a resounding no. The court held that such a mechanical application of Appendix H-1 violates both the substantive equality guaranteed under article 14 and the right to education envisaged by Article 41 under the Directive Principles of State Policy. Relying on the RPwD Act, the court emphasised that disability is not a fixed medical abstraction but a social construct, and that the State bears a positive duty to ensure reasonable accommodation.⁶

The court began by contextualising the RPwD Act as the legislative manifestation of India's obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), which enshrines dignity, autonomy, inclusion, and equality of opportunity as guiding principles. Referring to sections 2(m), 2(r), 2(y), 3, 15, and 32 of the Act, the court highlighted that inclusive education, reasonable accommodation, and non-discrimination are not benevolent concessions but enforceable statutory entitlements. The RPwD Act's 5% reservation in higher education, it observed, was designed to actualise this vision, not to be undermined by procedural or medical rigidity.

The court deconstructed the internal inconsistency of Appendix H-1, which paradoxically rendered those with less than 40% disability ineligible for the PwD quota, and those with 40% or more ineligible for medical courses altogether. This, the court held, created an "absurd position" where no candidate with a speech and language disability could ever qualify for an outcome clearly inconsistent with both the RPwD Act and constitutional norms. Drawing upon *State of Gujarat v. Ambica Mills Ltd.*,⁷ the court classified this as an instance of "over-inclusion" where an overbroad rule treats unequals alike. By lumping together individuals whose disabilities may or may not impede functional performance, the NMC's rule violated article 14's guarantee of rational classification. Echoing *Babita Puniya v. Union of India* (2020) 7 SCC 469, the court reiterated that equality is not achieved through facial uniformity but through rational differentiation; formal equality must give way to substantive rationality.

The court then invoked *Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer*⁸ to reaffirm that even facially neutral laws offend article 14 if their effect is discriminatory in operation. The "one size fits all" approach, previously condemned by *Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal*, was cited again to demonstrate how uniform disability thresholds ignore individual variation in capability and, consequently, perpetuate exclusion. In harmony with the reasoning in *Bambhaniya Sagar Vasharambhai v. Union of India*, the court underscored the need for policy reforms within the NMC to tailor eligibility standards to functional competence and assistive technologies.

6 *Vikash Kumar v. UPSC* (2021) 5 SCC 370; *Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India* (2023) 2 SCC 209.

7 (1974) 4 SCC 656.

8 AIR 1963 SC 591.

The judgment noted the Union Government's subsequent compliance with *Bambhaniya Sagar*, particularly the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment's communication dated January 25, 2024, directing the NMC to revise its regulations. This directive urged the Commission to integrate assistive technologies, develop functional classifications akin to those in the civil services, establish appellate mechanisms against Board decisions, and ensure that candidates are not disqualified after having been permitted to sit for NEET. The Supreme Court commended this initiative and directed the NMC to implement the revised framework before the next academic session (2025–26).

In a later segment, the Court drew upon *U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Braj Kishore*⁹ and Lord Denning's jurisprudence on purposive interpretation to emphasise that judges must look to the "mischief the law intended to remedy." Disability regulations, it noted, must therefore be interpreted dynamically to fulfil the RPwD Act's social purpose, not to entrench exclusion. The judgment then crystallised its practical directives: Disability Assessment Boards are not "monotonous automations" mechanically verifying numerical disability percentages; instead, they must assess functional capability and record whether the disability "will or will not come in the way" of pursuing the course. Boards must provide reasoned findings, and adverse determinations will remain subject to judicial review pending the creation of an appellate body. In the closing directions, the court held that quantified disability alone cannot disqualify a candidate if functional competence is established, and that the 2019 NMC Regulations must henceforth be read in the light of this interpretive guidance. It mandated that assessment boards record individualised reasoning, that NMC complete its regulatory revision, and that the appellant's admission previously kept vacant by an interim order be treated as valid.

In *Om Rathod v. The Director General of Health Services*,¹⁰ the Supreme Court decided how disability is to be treated in professional admissions. The appellant, a candidate with a locomotor disability (lower-limb myopathy/muscular dystrophy), cleared NEET-UG but was issued disability certificates by the AIIMS Nagpur Disability Assessment Board (88%) and a subsequent AIIMS Delhi Disability Assessment Board (nearly 80%), which concluded that he was ineligible for MBBS. The Board reported limited or no change with assistive devices and expressed safety concerns for clinical training. The appellant challenged the certificate in the Bombay High Court (writ), which declined to intervene, treating the Board's assessment as conclusive and thus approached the Supreme Court. This court ordered a functional reassessment and arranged a specialist assessment by Satendra Singh (a functional competence assessment using simulation labs and assistive devices). The specialist's report concluded that the appellant could pursue MBBS with reasonable accommodations and suggested specific accommodations and training modalities. On that basis, the Court allowed the

9 (1988) 4 SCC 274.

10 2024 INSC 836.

appellant to participate in counselling and held that no further assessments were required for his admission. The broader part of the judgment issues principles for how Disability Assessment Boards must function in the future. Can Disability Assessment Boards mechanically disqualify aspirants based on a straight-jacket quantified medical benchmark without a proper functional competence assessment? The court stressed functional competency rather than benchmarking, as the latter creates an environment that provides ways to include PwDs, not merely criteria for rejection. The court stated:¹¹

An assessment of functional competency entails an analysis of the skills a person with a disability must learn to compete and pursue a medical course. This is a marked difference from requiring a specific manner in which a candidate must use to achieve the outcome. For example, a functional competency model would require a candidate to communicate with patients effectively but would not require them to have speech or intact hands. By focusing on the end points, the approach avoids any ableism to seep into the assessment and avoids reifying that there is one and only one manner to achieve desired outcomes.

The court's analysis turned on interpreting Appendix H-1 to the 2019 Regulations and the meaning of the phrase "brought 80% disability below." It held that the phrase cannot be construed literally or medically; it must be read purposively to require a contextual assessment of functional ability, taking into account the effect of assistive devices and environmental accommodations. Assistive devices and adjustments should be used appropriately to assess functional capability, not to force an arbitrary numerical reduction. The aim is to judge competence relative to course outcomes (communication, clinical decision-making, safety), not to game the percentage metric.¹²

Disability is not a thing to be overcome or brought down, but an attribute to be acknowledged and accommodated. The use of the term 'brought below 80%,' as well-intentioned as it may be, fails at this foundational premise. One cannot assume that all persons with more than 80% locomotor disability are incompetent to pursue medicine when their functional abilities have not been assessed. The medical model of disability apparent in the phrase must give way to a social model of disability which takes into account the variety of experiences and outcomes which persons with disabilities have when they interact with different kinds of societies and accommodations.

The court reasserted its decision in *Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. The Union of India*¹³ that the duty of Disability Assessment Boards extends beyond quantification.¹⁴ They must determine whether, with reasonable accommodation, the candidate can meet the functional requirements of medical training. Reasonable

¹¹ *Id.*, para 26.

¹² *Id.*, para 23.

¹³ (2024) 14 SCC158.

¹⁴ 2024 INSC 775.

accommodation, as defined in the RPwD Act,¹⁵ is not a matter of charity but a legal right, and its denial constitutes discrimination. The Court drew on its earlier decisions in *Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission*¹⁶ and *Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India*¹⁷ to reaffirm that disability rights cannot be confined within the medical model that measures impairments; they must be evaluated within the social model that recognises barriers and accommodations.

The judgment also points towards the procedural dimension of equality. It criticised the inconsistency and opacity of multiple assessments the appellant was subjected to and observed that repetitive, non-transparent evaluations not only undermine fairness but also inflict psychological harm. Boards, it held, are obliged to act transparently, to inform candidates of the process to be followed, to provide reasoned findings, and to base conclusions on objective, reproducible tests. Assessments should be conducted by multidisciplinary panels with domain expertise and training in social model-based disability assessment, rather than purely the medical model. The Court directed the relevant authorities to ensure the training of Board members and the establishment of enabling units within medical institutions to facilitate accommodations. The Court keeps a careful balance; it does not purport to become an expert board but will correct procedural or legal errors (e.g., failure to consider assistive devices, inability to conduct simulation-based functional tests, or issuing conclusory opinions). The remedy here was targeted (admission counselling slot; no further assessments), reflecting judicial restraint yet robust protection of rights.

IV ACCESSIBILITY IS NOT A STANDALONE RIGHT; IT IS A PREREQUISITE FOR PWDS TO MEANINGFULLY EXERCISE OTHER RIGHTS

The case of *Rajive Raturi v. Union of India*¹⁸ arises from a long-standing judicial engagement with the question of accessibility for persons with disabilities in India. *Rajive Raturi* is a jurisprudential and practical milestone; it transforms accessibility from aspirational rhetoric into a legally enforceable floor, not an optional ceiling. The litigation traces back to earlier proceedings in which the Supreme Court repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the slow and fragmented implementation of the RPwD Act. The Court flagged a fundamental problem: although section 40 mandates the Central Government to formulate mandatory accessibility standards, the corresponding Rule 15 of the 2017 Rules merely incorporated a set of 13 sectoral documents issued by various ministries, which the court suspected were largely advisory and unsuitable to serve as enforceable “standards.” To evaluate this suspicion, the court appointed the Centre for Disability Studies (CDS) at NALSAR University to conduct a comprehensive study of these documents.

The NALSAR-CDS report, titled “Finding Sizes for All,” confirmed the court’s concerns by demonstrating that the documents referenced under Rule 15 used

15 Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 (Act 49 of 2016), s. 2(y).

16 (2021)5 SCC 370.

17 (2023)2 SCC 209.

18 2024 INSC 858.

inconsistent terminology, conflicting measurements, and non-mandatory language such as “may,” “should,” and “recommend,” rather than “shall” or “must.” This revealed that the so-called “accessibility standards” lacked uniformity, technical reliability, and enforceability. The Court noted that this was not a minor administrative lapse but a serious structural defect in the disability rights framework, because without genuine standards, the statutory enforcement mechanisms could not function at all.

The pendency of this matter before the Supreme Court for several years is significant, as it reflects both the gravity of the issue and the executive’s persistent failure to fulfil its statutory obligations. During the pendency, the court repeatedly reminded the Union and State Governments that accessibility is not an optional welfare measure but a constitutional and statutory entitlement, flowing from articles 14 and 21 and grounded in the RPwD Act’s commitment to equality and dignity. The court emphasised that its continuing supervision was necessary precisely because the absence of mandatory standards created a legal vacuum, leaving millions of persons with disabilities without effective rights.

In its final judgment, the Supreme Court held that Rule 15(1) is ultra vires section 40 because it substitutes binding standards with a collection of inherently unenforceable guidelines. The court explained that delegated legislation cannot dilute a clear legislative mandate, and importing soft-law documents into a statutory scheme meant to ensure enforceability defeats the very purpose of the Act. The seriousness of the court’s conclusion is evident from its strong remedial directions, which require the Union Government to frame fresh, mandatory accessibility standards within three months and to consult experts, including the CDS and stakeholders. Additionally, operationalise the Act’s enforcement mechanisms and file a compliance report by March 7, 2025.

V DISABILITY AS A DETERMINANT IN MAINTENANCE OBLIGATIONS

In *Priyanka Singh v. Pankaj Singh Sengar*,¹⁹ the High Court of Karnataka confronted the complex intersection of matrimonial maintenance and permanent disability, ultimately foregrounding disability as the determinative factor in assessing a husband’s legal liability to maintain his wife and child. The case arose from a matrimonial dispute in which the wife sought enhanced interim maintenance and the recovery of accumulated arrears. At the same time, the husband, who had initially been employed with a substantial salary, incurred a subsequent 75% chronic neurological disability, certified by NIMHANS and validated through disability certificates issued by both the State and Central Government authorities.

The court observed that the disability was not merely medical but functional, affecting cognitive abilities, mobility, and employability, thereby stripping the husband of the legal status of an “able-bodied man,” a prerequisite for maintenance obligations. The court rejected the wife’s allegations of fraudulent disability. It relied on authoritative medical certification and the husband’s visible condition in

19 Writ Petition No.48615 of 2013 (GM - FC).

court, emphasising that disability must be treated as a substantive change in circumstances under maintenance jurisprudence.

Drawing on *Rajnish v. Neha*,²⁰ the court reaffirmed that severe disability requiring constant care is a relevant and mitigating factor while quantifying or continuing maintenance obligations.

“(e) Serious Disability and ill health:²¹

93. Serious disability or ill health of a spouse, child/children from the marriage/dependent relative who requires constant care and recurrent expenditure, would also be a relevant consideration while quantifying maintenance.”

Consequently, it held that compelling a severely disabled man who himself required support to satisfy mounting arrears of nearly 19 lakh would be both legally untenable and morally oppressive. The court therefore limited the husband’s liability to the period before his disability, set aside arrest and fine-levy warrants issued in execution, and rejected the wife’s plea for enhancement. At the same time, it carved an equitable path by directing the husband’s father to meet the minor child’s needs, especially for education, recognising a continuing moral responsibility within the family structure.

VI DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION AS A DUTY AND NOT AN ACT OF CHARITY

In *Anirban Pal v. Punjab National Bank*,²² the High Court of Calcutta faced institutional insensitivity. Due to a motor vehicle accident that rendered the petitioner 70% physically disabled, the protections guaranteed under both the Bank’s Transfer Policy and the RPwD Act were denied to the petitioner. The petitioner, a Scale-III officer, was promoted to Scale-IV but was transferred out of Kolkata to Patna, despite clear guidelines exempting disabled employees from routine or promotional transfers when local vacancies exist. Although vacancies were indeed available in Kolkata, the Bank ignored its statutory and internal obligations, compelling the petitioner to suffer acute physical and psychological distress, eventually forcing him to seek reversion to a lower post merely to return to his home city, where necessary caregiving support was available.

The court cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Net Ram Yadav v. State of Rajasthan*:²³

31. One of the hindrances/disadvantages faced by physically disabled persons is the inability to move freely and easily. In consideration of the obstacles encountered by persons with disabilities, the State has issued the said notification/circular dated 20th July 2000 for posting disabled persons to places of their choice,

20 (2021) 2 SCC 324.

21 *Id.*, para 70.

22 WPA 10195 of 2023.

23 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1022.

to the extent feasible. The object of this benefit to the physically disabled is to, inter alia, enable the physically disabled to be posted at a place where assistance may readily be available. The distance from the residence may be a relevant consideration to avoid commuting long distances...

The court said that this conduct violated Clause 16(ii) of the Bank's Transfer Policy and the broader mandate of dignity, equality, and reasonable accommodation embedded in the Act. It highlighted that the Bank's actions were not only arbitrary but "inhuman," defeating the very object of disability rights legislation aimed at enabling equal participation in the workplace. The Bank's failure to consider available vacancies in Kolkata while at the same time accommodating newly promoted officers in the same city exposes an entrenched hierarchy that often treats disability accommodations as acts of benevolence rather than enforceable rights. The court's observation regarding "misplaced egoistic feathers" within bureaucratic structures further points towards the pervasive cultural resistance to accommodating disability.

"34. This Court's mind is also not, therefore, fully free from doubt that the petitioner's continuous request for reposting at Calcutta may have ruffled misplaced egoistic feathers of his superiors. This is an unfortunate malaise that festers in hierarchies within Public Sector Banks and other bodies, which has and continues to severely impact manpower and impede the growth and well-being of an organisation and its employees. Any special request from an employee out of the ordinary, even if supported by the Bank's rules, is looked at with contempt and discomfort."

While the Court declined to restore the petitioner's promotion due to procedural delay on the petitioner's part, it imposed exemplary costs of 3 lakhs on the Bank and directed restoration of all service increments, signalling a strong judicial stance against discriminatory administrative practices. This judgment reaffirms that disability rights are not discretionary concessions but enforceable entitlements, and that public institutions bear a heightened duty to implement reasonable accommodation in both letter and spirit.

The case *Union of India v. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava*²⁴ centres on a visually impaired candidate who cleared the Civil Services Examination 2008 but was denied appointment despite giving clear service preferences and despite the existence of several backlog vacancies for persons with disabilities. He approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, which directed the authorities to compute backlog vacancies under the 1995 Act. Yet, the UPSC repeatedly informed him that no vacancies were available in the visually impaired category. The facts show that the government had failed to implement disability reservations in civil services from 1996 to 2009 and had also claimed "unsuitability" of visually impaired candidates

without issuing the mandatory exemption notification under section 33. This prolonged failure turned a statutory right into a burdensome struggle.

In its final relief, the Supreme Court crafted a corrective framework aimed at undoing years of injustice faced by the visually impaired candidate and others similarly situated. The court directed that the respondent and the ten visually impaired candidates ranked above him in the CSE-2008 merit list must be considered for appointment against the existing backlog vacancies reserved for persons with disabilities in IRS (IT) or any other suitable service. The court clarified that these appointments would operate prospectively, meaning the candidates would not receive arrears of salary or seniority benefits for the years lost due to the State's failure to implement the disability-reservation mandate. However, as a limited safeguard, it held that their service would be counted from the date on which the last visually impaired candidate from CSE-2008 was appointed, but only for retirement benefits. The court stated that these directions were a one-time exercise under article 142 of the Constitution, meant to remedy an exceptional situation arising from sustained non-compliance with the 1995 Act, and thus should not be treated as a precedent. In both cases, the rights-based guarantee was converted into a discretionary, charity-like treatment of disability. The court's intervention seeks to reinforce the view that the reservations for persons with disabilities are enforceable duties. It affirms that accessibility, accommodation, and equal participation must guide State action, not bureaucratic resistance.

These cases together show a clear shift toward a strong, rights-based approach to disability in India. The courts repeatedly hold that PwDs are entitled to equal access, dignity, and fair treatment, whether in films, public services, exams, workplaces, or family settings. In each decision, the judiciary rejected stereotypes and excuses offered by the State or private bodies and insisted on concrete steps to remove barriers. The cases also show that delays, inaction, and technical objections cannot defeat the rights guaranteed under disability law. Overall, this line of judgments makes one point clear: that is, disability rights are not charity but enforceable duties, and institutions must actively ensure inclusion and equality in practice, not just on paper.

