

ship, and that the judgment of both the lower courts should be affirmed. They will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty to dismiss the appeal. The appellants will pay the costs of it.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Solicitors for the appellant : Messrs. *Wrentmore & Swinhoe.*

Solicitors for the respondent : Messrs. *T. L. Wilson & Co.*

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MADHO PARSHAD (PLAINTIFF) v. MEHRBAN SINGH  
(DEFENDANT).

P.C.\*  
1890.  
April 25.  
June 25.

[On appeal from the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of  
Oudh.]

*Hindu Law—Joint family—Ancestral estate held jointly by family under the Mitakshara—Sale attempted by one member of his share—Effect of partition—On death of vendor, right by survivorship of other members—Equity of purchaser to have a lien against survivor.*

As to ancestral estate under the Mitakshara, so long as the estate is undivided and the share of a member of the family is indefinite, he cannot dispose of it without the consent of his co-parceners. *Held*, that, in a joint family, a nephew, having taken by survivorship the undivided share of an uncle deceased, was entitled to recover that share from a purchaser, to whom the uncle in his lifetime had sold it without the consent of his co-parceners, and without necessity; *held*, also, that the purchaser could have no lien on the share for return of the purchase-money.

As soon as partition is made;—actual partition not being in all cases essential, as for instance where the family has agreed to hold their estate in definite shares, or a member's undivided share, in execution of his creditor's decree, has been attached;—that will be regarded as sufficient to support the alienation of a member's interest, as if it had been his acquired property.

As regards members of a family living at the time when their alienation was set aside at the instance of another member, the Court, in *Mahabber Persad v. Ramyal Singh* (1), justly ordered that the property should be thenceforth possessed in defined shares, and that the shares of the members who had joined in the sale should be subject to a lien for the return of the purchase-money. But that case must be distinguished from the present. Here, the accrued right of survivorship precluded any such course. The nephew not being responsible for the personal debts and obligations of his

\* *Present*: LORD WATSON, SIR B. PEACOCK, and SIR R. COUCH.

(1) 12 B. L. R., 90.

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uncle, what might have been an enforceable equity against the interest of the latter, while it existed, could not affect the interest which had passed to a surviving co-parcener.

APPEAL from a decree (26th January 1888) of the Judicial Commissioner, affirming a decree (23rd November 1886) of the District Judge of Lucknow, reversing a decree (28th September 1886) of the Subordinate Judge of Unao.

The question now raised was whether the sale by a deceased member of a joint family of his share in ancestral estate, which the Courts below had set aside at the instance of a minor suing by his guardian, should not have been on the terms of this appellant, the purchaser, having a lien on the interest sold for the return of the purchase-money.

Ancestral shares in three zemindari villages, Parthiawan, Salehnainpur, and Aziznagar, in the Unao district, were jointly held by an undivided family to which belonged Sobha Sing, father of Mehrban Sing, plaintiff and respondent, and Zalim Sing, brother of Sobha. Madho Parshad, defendant, appellant, after the death of Sobha bought from Zalim his share in each of the above villages, receiving from him (and from Mussamat Chitta, described as his wife) three registered deeds of sale, dated 9th January 1885. These deeds stated that a share consisting of 1 anna 9 pies 33½, "out of the entire 20 biswas, or 16 annas of the zemindari hakkiat" of each of the three villages were sold, then being in the joint possession of Zalim Sing, and Mehrban Sing, a minor, the latter holding an equal share with Zalim, as shown by the khewat of regular settlement. The purchase-money for the share in the first was Rs. 6,000, and for the two other shares Rs. 2,000 each.

Zalim died on the 16th January 1885. This suit was brought on the 2nd January 1886, by his nephew, Mehrban Sing, through his mother and guardian, against Madho Parshad and Chitta, for cancellation of the deeds of 9th January 1885, and for possession, by right of survivorship, of Zalim's share.

<sup>a</sup> Madho Parshad's defence was that Zalim and the plaintiff were separate in estate, and the former had a right to transfer his share.

The Subordinate Judge's decree was in favour of the defendant. Zalim in his opinion had been separate from Sobha. He found that the village administration papers permitted transfers by co-sharers of their shares, subject to pre-emption by other co-sharers.

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This decree was reversed by the District Judge, who found that Zalim Sing and Mehrban Sing had been joint in estate. Under the Mitakshara which governed the parties, one joint-owner could not sell his share, and the administration papers did not control this, not referring to unpartitioned estate, or shares in it.

The Judicial Commissioner affirmed this judgment, finding no evidence that partition had ever taken place between Sobha and Zalim, who held in equal rights, according to entries in the khewat of settlement, the total share inherited by them from their father Newal Sing; and that a sharer in an undivided estate could not sell his share without the consent of his co-parceners.

Mr. *J. D. Mayne* for the appellant, after referring to other points in the case, argued that, although the plaintiff might be entitled, by survivorship, to the share which Zalim had purported to transfer, the purchaser might, upon an equitable view, nevertheless receive a charge for the amount of the purchase-money which he had paid upon the share. He cited *Mahabeer Persad v. Ramyad Singh* (1). Reference was also made to *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh* (2), and *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh* (3).

The respondents did not appear.

On a subsequent day, June 25th, their Lordships' judgment was delivered by

LORD WATSON.—In this case, which was heard *ex parte*, the appellant did not impugn the findings of fact upon which the judgments he complains of are based; and his argument was addressed to a single question of law.

The respondent, plaintiff in the suit, and his paternal uncle Zalim Singh, were the members of an undivided Hindu family, and, as such, were co-sharers of land in three villages situated in

(1) 12 B. L. R., 90.

(2) L. R., 4. I. A., 247; I. L. R., 3 Calc., 198.

(3) I. L. R., 5 Calc., 148; L. R., 6 I. A., 88.

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the district of Unao, in Oudh. Zalim died childless in January 1885. Seven days before his death he and Mussamat Chitta, therein described as his wife, executed and delivered three deeds of sale to the appellant of his undivided share and interest in each of these villages, at prices amounting in all to Rs. 10,000, which were duly paid by the appellant. These sales were made by the deceased for his own personal benefit, without the consent of the respondent, and without legal necessity.

The suit was brought by the respondent in January 1886, for cancellation of these three deeds of sale, with an alternative conclusion for pre-emption in the event of their validity being sustained. The Subordinate Judge held that they were valid, upon the ground, now admitted to be untenable, that by a Village custom each co-sharer was entitled to sell or mortgage his undivided interests; and, on payment by the respondent to the appellant of Rs. 10,000 within a time limited, he decreed pre-emption and possession, otherwise the suit to stand dismissed. On appeal, the District Judge reversed his decision and decreed cancellation of the sale deeds, holding that the alienation by Zalim was void, according to the law of the Mitakshara. The decree of the District Judge was affirmed, for the same reasons, by the Judicial Commissioner.

The appellant conceded in argument that the rules of the Mitakshara law which prevail in the Courts of Bengal are applicable in Oudh to the alienation of interests in a joint family estate. He likewise conceded that the sales by Zalim Singh, being without the consent of his co-parcener, and not justified by legal necessity, were according to that law invalid; but he maintained that the transactions being real, and the prices actually paid, the respondent could only recover the shares sold, subject to an equitable charge in his favour for the Rs. 10,000 which were received by Zalim.

The second point ruled by a Full Bench of the High Court at Calcutta, in *Sadabart Prasad Sahu v. Foolbush Koer* (1), arose in circumstances somewhat resembling those of the present case. The facts stated were that a member of a joint family had executed an ordinary mortgage in respect of his undivided

(1) 3 B. L. R. F. B., 31.

share of a portion of the family property, in order to raise money for himself, and not for the benefit of the family; and the point submitted for decision was, whether, after the death of the mortgagor, a surviving member of the joint family could recover possession from the mortgagee without redeeming. Sir Barnes Peacock, who delivered the judgment of the Bench, after a full examination of the authorities bearing upon the question, held that, according to Mitakshara law, the mortgagor "had no authority, without the consent of his co-sharers, to mortgage his undivided share in a portion of the joint-family property, in order to raise money on his own account and not for the benefit of the family;" but that the facts were not sufficiently stated to enable the Court to say whether the mortgaged interest could be recovered without redemption.

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The appellant referred to three subsequent decisions as illustrating and supplementing the doctrine laid down by the Full Bench in *Sadabari's* case. In dealing with these authorities, which appear to their Lordships to be perfectly consistent with that doctrine, it is necessary to keep the following considerations in view. Any one of several members of a joint family is entitled to require partition of ancestral property, and his demand to that effect, if it be not complied with, can be enforced by legal process. So long as his interest is indefinite, he is not in a position to dispose of it at his own hand, and for his own purposes; but, as soon as partition is made, he becomes the sole owner of his share, and has the same powers of disposal as if it had been his acquired property. Actual partition is not in all cases essential. An agreement by the members of an undivided family to hold the joint property individually in definite shares, or the attachment of a member's undivided share in execution of a decree at the instance of his creditor, will be regarded as sufficient to support the alienation of a member's interest in the estate or a sale under the execution.

Two of the cases referred to were decided by this Board. In *Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh* (1), a judgment-debtor of the father of a joint Hindu family under an attachment of his title and share exposed the whole family property to judicial

(1) L. R., 4 I. A., 247; I. L. R., 3 Calc., 198.

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sale, at which it was knocked down to a purchaser who obtained possession and the usual certificate of title. The son of the judgment-debtor then brought a suit for recovery of the estate thus sold against the purchaser, joining his father as a defendant. Their Lordships, distinguishing between the cases of purchase by private bargain and at an execution sale, held that the son was not entitled to recover that portion of the estate which represented the undivided share of the father, and declared that the purchaser had the right to take such proceedings as he might be advised for having the judgment-debtor's share and interest ascertained by actual partition. In *Suraj Bansi Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh* (1), the circumstances in so far as these related to the interest of the judgment-debtor were the same, with this important exception, that the latter died before the sale of his undivided share took place. It was pleaded for his minor sons that, at the time of the sale, the interest of the deceased had passed to them by survivorship; but their Lordships affirmed the right of the purchaser on the ground that, before their father's death, the execution proceedings had gone so far as to constitute, in favour of the judgment-creditor, a valid charge upon the joint estate, to the extent of the undivided interest of the deceased, which could not be defeated by that event. At the same time, their Lordships held it to be clear upon the authorities that, if no proceedings had been taken to enforce the debt in their father's lifetime, "his interest in the property would have survived on his death to his sons, so that it could not afterwards be reached by the creditor in their hands."

These two decisions lend no assistance to the argument of the appellant. He has not taken, and cannot now take, any proceedings against Zalim Sing, whose undivided interest, according to the law expressly laid down in the second of these decisions, passed on his death to the respondent, free from any claim at the instance of personal creditors of Zalim.

The appellant hardly disputed that the interest of Zalim passed by survivorship to the respondent; but he relied on the case of *Akhabeer Persad v. Ramyal Singh* (2), decided by the High

(1) L. R., 6 I. A., 88; I. L. R., 5 Calc., 148.

(2) 12 B. L. R., 90.

Court of Calcutta in 1873, as an authority for the proposition that the prices paid by him ought to form an equitable charge upon that interest, in a question with the respondent. In that case, the father of a Hindu family, with the knowledge and acquiescence of his elder son, mortgaged the joint property, without legal necessity, and without consent of a minor son, who was the other co-parcener. The mortgagees obtained a decree on their bond, in execution of which they, notwithstanding the objections of the minor co-parcener and his brother, caused the property to be sold, and themselves became the purchasers. In a suit against them at the instance of the two sons, the Court in the interest of the minor set aside the alienation, but directed that, on recovery of the property, it should be held and enjoyed in defined shares, and that the shares of the father and his elder son should be jointly and severally subject to the lien thereon of the mortgagees for the sum advanced by them with interest until repayment. The reasons assigned by Phear and Ainslie, JJ., for ordering partition, and making the loan an equitable charge upon the shares other than that of the minor, were shortly these, that a decree, without such qualification, would have had the effect of restoring their property to the father and son, and leaving them at the same time in possession of the money which they had borrowed on its security, a result which the learned Judges justly considered would be contrary to equity and good conscience.

Their Lordships are unable to see that any analogy exists between that case and the present. It is unnecessary to decide whether, if Zalim Singh had been still alive, and so entitled to resume his undivided share on cancellation of the sale deeds, it would have been possible to order partition and to charge Zalim's divided share with the Rs. 10,000 paid to him by the appellant. That course is rendered impossible by his death. It might have been quite consistent with equitable principles to refuse to Zalim restitution of the interest which he sold, except on condition of its being made at once available for repayment of the price which he received. But the respondent is not affected by any equity of that kind. He took in his own right by survivorship, and is not liable for the personal debts and obligations of his uncle Zalim; and it appears to their Lordships, that an equity which might have

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been enforced against Zalim's interest whilst it existed cannot be made to affect that interest when it has passed to a surviving coparcener, except by repealing the rule of the Mitakshara law. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal ought to be dismissed.

*Appeal dismissed.*

Solicitors for the appellant: Messrs. Young, Jackson, & Beard.

C. D.

P. C.\*  
 1889.  
 Nov. 20 & 21.  
 1890.  
 July 19.

UMES CHUNDER SIRCAR (PLAINTIFF) v. ZAHUR FATIMA AND OTHERS (DEFENDANTS).

[On appeal from the High Court at Calcutta.]

*Mortgage—Redemption of prior mortgage by puisne mortgagee—Sale, at his suit, of mortgaged property, on what terms, and with payment of what incumbrances—Purchases before and during mortgagee's suit, and after decree therein how affected by it—Interest on mortgage debt, when reducible by the decree from its date; and when continuing payable at the contract rate—Execution of decree—Civil Procedure Code, s. 266—Attachment of future estate—Construction, according to Mahomedan law, of grant of such estate.*

Upon a claim by a puisne mortgagee to redeem prior incumbrances, and in the alternative, for a decree ordering a sale of the property mortgaged, the sale was decreed, with application of the purchase-money to pay incumbrances in their due order; and with redemption by the plaintiff of a prior mortgagee, who was to have an option to redeem.

Previously to the mortgage, a fractional interest in the property (which interest was purchased by the plaintiff at a judicial sale) had been the subject of a settlement by a Mahomedan on his wife, under the condition that if he should have no child by her, his two sons by another wife should each have an estate therein. He died without other children. *Held*, that the two sons had taken definite interests capable of being attached, within section 266 of the Civil Procedure Code, not being mere expectancies. *Held*, also, that a judicial sale of property, purporting to be of all the interests of a judgment-debtor, carries with it any enlargement thereof that may have occurred after the attachment and before the sale; and that, accordingly, the above-mentioned settlor having died without a child by that wife, between the date of the attachment and the sale, the sons' augmented interests passed thereby.

\* Present: LORD HOBHOUSE, LORD MACNAGHTEN, SIR B. PEACOCK, and SIR R. COUCH.