Before Mr. Justice Brett and Mr. Justice Mookerjee.

## SADASOOK AGARWALLA

 $v_{\bullet}$ 

## BAIKANTA NATH BASUNIA.\*

1904 July 11.

Limitation-Acknowledgment in writing—" Signing," what amounts to -Limitation Act (XV of 1877) s. 19—Hatchitta-Interest.

Money was lent on a hatchitta which bore at the head of it the name and signature of the debtor. Under an entry of a certain date on the debt side written by the debtor himself and stating that a certain amount was due as interest on the principal sum, occurred the words "likhitan khod" or "writer self," also written by the debtor himself:—

Held, that this amounted to the signing of an acknowledgment within the meaning of s. 19 of the Limitation Act, and was sufficient to save a suit based on the hatchitta from being barred by limitation.

Andarji Kalyanji v. Dulabh Jeevan (1), Jekisan Bapuji v. Bhowsar Bhoga Jetha (2) and Gangadharrao Venkatesh v. Shidramapa Balapa Desai (3) followed. Brojender Coomar v. Bromomoye Chowdhrani (4) referred to.

SECOND APPEAL by the plaintiff, Sadasook Agarwalla.

The plaintiff sued the defendant, Baikanta Nath Basunia, for the recovery of Rs. 949, being the amount due on a hatchita khatta book. The khatta, which was filed, contained accounts of several persons, and the page containing the defendant's account ran as follows:—

To the High in dignity Srijukta Babu Sadasook Agarwalla.

Stamp of one anna.

Sri Baikanta Nath Basunis.

- \* Appeal from Appellate Decree, No. 500 of 1902, against the decree of Benode Behari Mitter, Subordinate Judge of Jalpaiguri, dated Sept. 25, 1901, affirming the decree of Behari Lal Chatterjee, Munsif of that district, dated Nov. 19, 1900.
  - (1) (1877) I. L. R. 5 Bom. 88.
- (3) (1898) I. L. R. 18 Bom. 586.
- (2) (1880) I. L. R. 5 Bom. 89.
- (4) (1878) I. L. R. 4 Calc. 885.

Rs.

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Credit.

Debit.

9th Jaistha 1305, thirteen		
hundred and five sal, through		
self, in the account of the money		
taken on the 7th Assar, in cash		
Company's		
Total nine Rupees only.		
Writer self.		

	Rs. A.	
6th Asar 1802 sal, through		
self, in cash Company's	300	0
Total three hundred Company's		
Rupees only.		
On this sum I will pay interest		
at the rate of 21, two rupees and		
four annas, per cent. per mensem.		
7th Asar, through Beni		
Madhub	25	0
12th day, through Beni		
Madhub	5	0
Total thirty Company's Rupecs		
only.		
The interest on this sum from		
12 2002 7 4- 44- 041-		

The interest on this sum from the year 1302 sal up to the 9th Jaistha 1305 sal, on settlement of account ... 267 12

Total amount of interest two hundred and sixty seven Rupees and twelve annas only.

. Writer self.

The total of Rs. 949 is obtained by adding to the amount stated in the hatchitta the sum of Rs. 360-4-0, being the interest due thereon from the 10th Jaistha 1305 to Bhadra 1307, the suit having been instituted on the 20th September 1900.

The defendant, while admitting the hatchitta, pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. He admitted to have himself written the entire account both on the debit and credit sides, including the portion in which the amount of interest was stated on settlement of accounts, and to have signed it himself at the top and written the words "writer self" at the bottom both on the debit and credit sides; but he contended that the portion containing the amount of interest or settlement of accounts was not an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of Act XV of 1877, and not being stamped, was inadmissible in evidence.

The Munsif held that the statement of interest due made on the 9th Jaistha 1305, was an acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of Act XV of 1877, but was not admissible in evidence as it was not duly stamped; and that therefore the claim was barred by limitation with the exception of Rs. 25, lent on the 7th Assar 1302. The suit was accordingly decreed for this sum AGARWALLA only.

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On appeal by the plaintiff, the Subordinate Judge held that the words constituting the adjustment of interest were not signed by the defendant; and being of opinion that the whole claim was barred by limitation, he dismissed the appeal.

Babu Kritanta Kumar Bose (Babu Einode Behary Mukerjee with him), for the appellant, contended that the debtor's signature at the top of the hatchitta, together with the words "writer self" written by the debtor at the foot, constituted an acknowledgment which satisfied the requirements under section 19 of Act XV of 1877: see Andarji Kalyanji v. Dulabh Jeevan(1) and Jekisan Bapuji v. Bhowsar Bhoga Jetha(2). See also David Ramkhelwan Sahai(3). The case of Gangadharrao Venkatesh v. Shidramapa Balupa Desai(4) is in my favour. The nature of a hatchitta is discussed in Brojender Coomar v. Bromomoue Chowdhrani(5) and Brojo Gobind Shaha v. Goluck Shaha (6).

Babu Kishori Lal Sarkar (Babu Debendra Nath Bagchi with him), for the respondent, contended that the words "writer self" did not amount to a signature: see Abdul Gafur v. Queen-Empress (7) and Darby and Bosanquet on Limitation, p. 108.

BRETT AND MOOKERJEE JJ. The plaintiff-appellant in this appeal brought a suit to recover from the defendant-respondent the sum of Rs. 949 on a hatchitta.

The plaintiff's case was that the defendant had borrowed Rs. 300 from him on the 6th Assar 1302 corresponding to the 19th June 1895, Rs. 25 on the 7th Assar, and Rs. 5 on the 12th Assar, thus making a total of Rs. 330; that on the 9th Jaistha 1305 corresponding to 22nd May 1898, the defendant had acknowledged

<sup>(1) (1877)</sup> I. L. R. 5 Bom. 88.

<sup>(4) (1893)</sup> I. L. R. 18 Bom. 586.

<sup>(2) (1880)</sup> I. L. R. 5 Bom. 89.

<sup>(5) (1878)</sup> I. L. R. 4 Calc. 685.

<sup>(3) (1901) 6</sup> C. W. N. 329.

<sup>~(6) (1882)</sup> I. L. R. 9 Calc. 127.

<sup>(7)^(1896)</sup> I. L. R. 23 Caic. 896.

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that that sum was due together with interest thereon from the 19th of June 1895 up to that date, amounting to Rs. 267-12, and on the same date he had paid a sum of Rs. 9 in part payment of the loan taken on the 7th Assar. The present suit was instituted on the 20th September 1900, and the plaintiff's case was that by reason of the acknowledgment, made by the defendant on the 22nd May 1898, the suit was within time.

The main defence taken in the case was that the suit was barred by limitation. The suit was brought on the hatchitta which has been translated and has been placed before us. That document sets out the facts already mentioned. It bears at the head of it the name and signature of the defendant. Under the entry of the 22nd May 1898, which the plaintiff states is an acknowledgment of indebtedness on the part of the defendant, there are written the words "likhitan khod" ("writer self") and on the credit side under the payment are written the same words "writer self."

The case for the defence was that the acknowledgment on the debit side did not comply with the provisions of section 19 of the Limitation Act so as to save the debt from being barred by limitation. The entry on the credit side, it is also alleged, as it did not specify that it was made on account of interest, must be taken to be a payment of part of the principal only of the loan taken on the 7th Assar 1302, that is to say, the 20th of June 1895.

The Munsif held that, so far as the debt of the Rs. 300 was concerned and the interest thereon, the suit was barred by limitation. He also held that the suit, so far as the plaintiff sought to recover the sum of Rs. 5 borrowed on the 12th Assar 1302 was concerned, was also barred; but he held that the balance of the loan of Rs. 25 taken on the 7th Assar 1302 was not barred by reason of the payment of a part of the principal made on the 9th Jaistha 1305 corresponding to the 22nd May 1898.

The plaintiff appealed against the decision of the Munsif and his appeal was dismissed. He has in consequence preferred this appeal to this Court.

The only question which has been argued before us, and which we have to decide, is whether the plaintiff was not barred from

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recovering the sum of Rs. 300 lent on the 6th Assar 1302 correspending to the 19th June 1895, and the other two sums borrowed from him on the 7th Assar and 12th Assar, by reason of the fact AGARWALLA that on the 22nd May 1898 the defendant acknowledged his indebtedness for those sums and for the interest due on those sums up to that date, amounting to Rs. 267-12.

After hearing the learned vakils on both sides we are of opinion that the suit was not barred. We have been referred to two decisions of the Judges of the Bombay High Court, viz., Andarji Kalyanji v. Dulabh Jeevan (1) and Jekisan Bapuji v. Bhowsar Bhoga Jetha(2). In those two cases the Bombay High Court held in two accounts, similar to the hatchitta in the present case, in which the debtor had signed his name on the top and then had afterwards made entries, and, at the foot of the entries, had written in one the words "by his own hand" and in the other the words "dustakat khod," that those two documents were sufficiently signed within the meaning of section 19 of Act XV of 1877, and section 4 of Act XIV of 1859 (the previous Limitation Act).

This Court in the case of Brojender Coomar v. Bromomoye Chowdhrani(3) has held that when an account in a hatchitta has two sides to it, the one headed "amount advanced" and the other headed "amount received" and the amount actually due on such account varies from time to time and depends upon the relation of the amount advanced to the amount received, it is not necessary that each entry shall be stamped in order to constitute it an acknowledgment against the debtor. It was also held that in a document of that kind, what the Court has to look to is the intention of the parties, and whether the entries are such that they cannot be detached from one another because they all form part of one account, and, that if those conditions are fulfilled, the document must for the purpose of being validly stamped be treated as a whole, and that each entry in it need not be separately considered. The hatchitta relied on in the present case is similar to that considered by this Court in the case mentioned above.

<sup>(2) (1880)</sup> I. L. R. 5 Bom. 89. (1) (1877) I. L. R. 5 Bom. SS. (3) (1878) I. L. R. 4 Calc. 885.

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The natchitta represents the account between the present defendant and the present plaintiff; the entries in this account were admitted by the defendant, practically in his written statement, and certainly specifically by his pleader in the Court of first instance to be all in his handwriting. The entry on the debit side dated the 9th Jaistha 1305, corresponding to the 22nd May 1898, which is the important entry for the purpose of determining the question of limitation in this appeal, is admittedly in the handwriting of the defendant. In fact the defendant's pleader before the Munsif referred specifically to the entry, and admitted that it was written by the defendant. All then we have to consider is whether the words "likhitan khod" at the bottom of that entry, coupled with the fact that at the top of the page appears the name of the defendant, are sufficient to amount to a signing of the acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act. In our opinion in such a case it is necessary to consider the intention of the parties, and, whether it can be taken that the words "likhitan khod" were the form of words adopted by the defendant for the purpose of affixing his signature to such documents.

The Bombay High Court in the case of Gangadharrao Venkatesh v. Sidramana Balana Desai(1) held that where certain words had been used at the commencement of a letter and certain other words at the end of it, neither of which were an actual signature of the name of the writer, still when it was shown that the writing of these specified words by persons of the class to which the defendant in that case belonged at the top and bottom of letters was the usual way amongst such persons of authenticating letters, the writing of those words was a signing within section 19 of the Limitation Act. In their judgment they state, referring to a previous case which they followed, that "the ground of that decision must be that the 'signing' in such manner as is usually adopted by the debtor with the view of showing that he intended to be bound by the document, renders the document effective as an acknowledgment under the section." They go on to say: "It is on this ground indeed that it has also been held

<sup>(1) (1893)</sup> I. L. R. 18 Bom. 586.

that the 'signing' may be by writing the name in any other part of the document provided it be intended to operate as an acknowledgment by the party that it is his instrument."

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We think that the principle adopted by the Bombay High Court should be held to apply to the present case. We hold that the words "likhitan khod" at the foot of the two entries in this account indicate that it was the usual method adopted by the debtor of signing hatchittas when his name appeared at the top of them as the debtor, and we may observe that this is not an unusual method of signing adopted in such documents. We are also satisfied, and in fact it has not been seriously disputed, that it was the intention of the debtor when he made the entry on the 22nd May 1898 to acknowledge his indebtedness.

We therefore think that the acknowledgment bearing at the foot the word "likhitan khad" was a sufficient acknowledgment within the meaning of section 19 of the Limitation Act, to save the debt from being barred by limitation. It has been suggested to us that the acknowledgment only applies to the interest. But reading the words of the acknowledgment and having regard to the form of the entry in the hatchitta, we are satisfied that it was intended to acknowledge not merely the interest due, but also the debt on which that interest had been calculated.

We therefore hold that so far as the whole claim of the plaintiff is concerned, the acknowledgment of the 22nd May 1898 is sufficient to save it from being barred by limitation. We must therefore set aside the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below and in lieu thereof decree the plaintiff's claim in full with costs.

Appeal allowed.